Sykes-Picot agreements: A double negotiation resulting in a betrayal

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CONTENTS
Introduction........................................................................................................................................3
Making the bids.....................................................................................................................................4
The epistolary exchanges between Henry McMahon and Sharif Hussein. ..................................6
The agreements on European Empires’ future acquisitions............................................................10
The absolute necessity of an Arab collaboration .............................................................................16
Conclusion .........................................................................................................................................18
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................................20
Introduction

On 6th of May 1916, two Empires, France and Britain, reached a conclusion which definitively affected the Arab world. After the First World War, the Allied Powers shared the Middle East after the partition of the Ottoman Empire. It was the result of Sykes-Picot agreements. The two main negotiators were the British Mark Sykes and the French François Georges-Picot. They negotiated secretly the areas of influence and administration zones of each Empire. And several other powers participated in the negotiations like the Russian Empire and the Kingdom of Italy.

But simultaneously, Sir Mc Mahon, British High Commissioner at Cairo, communicated epistolary with the Sharif of Mecca, Hussein. The objective of the exchange was the negotiation of an Arab uprising against the Ottoman forces. The agreements foresaw the creation of an Arab independent State guaranteed by Britain. These negotiations lasted several months. Initially, Mc Mahon did not know the existence of an alternative agreement. Inadvertently, he promised a land already negotiated and shared by Sir Sykes and Georges-Picot. But after he knew the existence of the secret agreement, he kept on lying to Sharif Hussein, asking him for Arab help to repulse the Ottoman oppressor.

To sum up, Britain negotiated an Arab revolt against its enemy, the Ottoman Empire. The British representatives fooled the Arabs with false promises. And afterward, they seized upon the land with France cooperation. The two European Empires extended their imperial lands with mandates in the Middle East. So the question of negotiation processes occurs in the negotiation cases, the first between Mc Mahon and the Sharif Hussein, and the second between Sir Sykes and Georges-Picot. What were the negotiation processes, resulting in the partition of Middle East between France and Britain? Indeed the British representative fueled an Arab uprising before fooling the aspiration of an independent Arab State.

Then, different perspectives of negotiation theories are necessary to explain the meeting of interests upon the Middle East territories and oil. Firstly, the search for allies by the Allied powers will be scanned. Actually, Britain found potential allies in countries like Italy, Russia, or the Arab population. And these participants already discussed the partition of war spoils. A structural theory combined with a cultural one explained the entry in war of different parties. Secondly, the following chapter gives details on the epistolary exchange between Sir Mc Mahon and the Sharif of Mecca, Hussein. The processual approach shows the manner by which Britain inherited of an untenable promise done to Arabs. Also, it explained the positions of negotiators in their pursuance of outcomes. Thirdly, the following chapter tells the negotiation of secret Sykes-Picot agreements. The behaviors of Sir Sykes and Georges-Picot showed their attitude and their interdependence in the negotiation. Fourthly, the strategic approach concludes the rational ways taken by the negotiators. The dilemmas of trust and honesty converged, revealing the trust from Arabs towards lying European representatives.
Making the bids

The First World War occurred between the Allied Powers against the Central Powers. The influence area of Central Powers extended itself to the Ottoman Empire which controlled the Middle East. The British Empire, holding Egypt, was afraid of Ottoman soldiers coming. France and United Kingdom wanted to find allies to fight the Ottoman Empire. They tried to rally minorities under Ottoman rule to weaken it. Because an Arab revolt would have allowed the Great Britain to defeat the German ally. In this way, there was an environmental context of war overlooking the negotiation in the immediate context. The agreements tackled the Ottoman Empire, then the Central Powers were external Stakeholders. Moreover, the war created instability where ratio of power could change and new unexpected situations happened. By example, new parties could join or leave the war in the Allied factions.

A possible ally was Hussein ibn Ali, Sharif of Mecca, and boss of the Hashemite family, descendant of the Prophet. On 31 October 1914, the Marshall Lord Kitchener sent a message to the Emir Abdallah, second son of Hussein ibn Ali. He wrote: « Salaams au Chérif de la Mecque. Le Gouvernement ottoman, agissant à l’encontre de la volonté du Sultan, a commis un acte d’agression en faisant envahir le territoire égyptien par des bandes de soldats turcs. Si la nation arabe assiste l’Angleterre dans ce conflit, l’Angleterre est prête à garantir qu’aucune intervention n’aura lieu en Arabie et fournira aux Arabes toute l’assistance requise contre une agression étrangère, venue de l’extérieur ». After receiving this letter, the emir Abdallah tried to convince his father who accepted. Actually, Britain was an empire with a lot of powers compared to Sharif Hussein. This one knew his camp needed more power to fight the other empire, the Ottoman one. In another side, the partition of Middle East is discussed between France and Britain with the Sykes-Picot treaty. Concerning the immediate context, several negotiations occurred simultaneously, one between Mc Mahon and the Sharif Hussein and the other between Sykes and Georges-Picot. Their relationships had an important impact on the negotiation process and outcome. When the same things were promised, Britain pursued their genuine negotiation with the French representative rather than the Arab one. Indeed, Britain chose the immediate Stakeholders with which it had the best relationship and the best desired outcome. The European powers had the same culture because they shared values.

In the Triple Entente side, on 20 March 1915, the Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey and the Italian ambassador in London were negotiating about the Italy’s entry into war. According to the pact of London on 26 April 1915, Italy accepted to enter in the war, and in return, it would receive some territories from south Anatolia in compensation.

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4 HABIB Mohammed M., PHATAK Arvind V., op.cit, 30 p.
1915, Russia proclaimed its claims on Istanbul and the Straits. Moreover, the French ambassador in London, Paul Cambon, asked Sir Grey to arrange an unofficial exchange of view about each country’s aims in Asiatic Turkey. Sir Grey answered to Cambon that the government had not yet decided “whether Mesopotamia should form part of this independent Muslim state “or whether we should put forward a claim for ourselves in that region.”

Britain benefited from its contextual source of power in the standards of Raven. It was an imperial power with a high best alternative to a negotiate argument, or BATNA. During the negotiations to convince other powers to enter in war, Britain might pass from one party to another. It could promise territories to Italy, Russia, France, or the Sharif Hussein. The objectives were to find allies against the Ottoman Empire, no matter which was the allies. Each party desiring to join the British side would have receive a part of war spoils. The negotiations focused on the interests of each participant.

During the war, Britain armies went to Constantinople, Palestine and Mesopotamia compared to the symbolic presence of French armies. Britain reinforced its position compared to France. The control of Middle East would have conferred an uninterrupted British territory from South Africa to Thailand. In the beginning, this occupation of Arab territory was a temporary situation found by France and Britain in a war-time situation. The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affair explained in his Twenty-five years: “I was not very anxious to carve up Asia Minor in advance: if we won the war, spheres of interest would have to be defined; but the thing seemed rather premature: what we needed first was to concentrate on winning the war… I never regarded this Treaty as entailing any obligation on us except to fulfil a promise to give Arabs independence. There was no obligation on us to occupy or administer Mesopotamia, but it was desirable to make sure that others European Powers would not push into Mesopotamia and down to the Persian Gulf.”

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The epistolary exchanges between Henry McMahon and Sharif Hussein.

After 1915, Sir Mc Mahon, British High Commissioner at Cairo, asked to the Sharif Hussein his help to fuel an uprising against the Ottoman. In return, he promised the creation of an independent national Arab State. To accept this agreement, the Sharif Hussein imposed his conditions. The conditions transmitted the 12 July 1915 were the following:

Firstly, the British government would help at the creation of an independent Arab State. Like boundaries, this State would be delimited by the Persian Gulf, The Red Sea, the Egyptian boundaries, the Mediterranean Sea, the villayet of Alep and Mosul and the Persian boundary. But the Aden colony would not be a part of the integration. Secondly, the United Kingdom government would guaranty the integrity of the Arab State against every interference and aggression. Equally, the United Kingdom would support the new government in case of intern revolt. These engagements would worth until internal organizational accomplishment of the new government. Thirdly, the United Kingdom would occupy the port of Bassorah until the Arab government finish its organization. In counterpart, the United Kingdom government would pay back its use by a sum fixed in common by the two governments. Fourthly, the British government would cut the railway between Anatolia and the Arab countries to stop the advance of enemy forces before the Arabs.¹³

In answer, on 30 august 1915, Mc Mahon agreed with the Sharif Hussein, but he said that a discussion about the future limits of Turkey was premature. Then, the Foreign Affair, Edward Grey, gave more authority to Mc Mahon. This one received the authority to ‘give cordial assurances’ about the territories claimed by Hussein.¹⁴ In the same time, the Secretary of State for India, Austen Chamberlain, sent a message to the Viceroy of India, Lord Hardinge, on 21 October 1915. He explained :"Les Arabes hésitent et marcheront vraisemblablement avec les Turcs si nous n’usons pas d’importants moyens de séduction à leur égard."¹⁵ To manage the conflict, the strategy employed by the British men were the ‘Contending’. According to the dual concern model of Rubin, Pruitt and Kim, Britain aspired to pursue their own outcomes strongly with little concern for whether Arab obtained their independence.¹⁶ But Britain did not use the coercion to persuade the Sharif of Mecca, but the false promises. Moreover, the negotiations lasted several years by exchanges of letters. The long periods of time influence the negotiators to concede more on the substantive subjects. The Sharif Hussein started the negotiation with a willing to trust Mc Mahon even with little information on him.¹⁷ They needed each other because they were interdependent to reach their objective. So the trust toward the other party followed the cooperative motivation.¹⁸

¹⁴ HINSLEY Francis Harry, op.cit., 702 p.
On 24 October 1915, Mc Mahon kept on the correspondence with Sharif Hussein. He made several reservations, arguing that the districts of Mersin and Alexandretta, and the West part of Damas, Homs, Adana and Alep districts were not purely Arab. So they should be excluded from limits and foresee borders. Furthermore, he added that the United Kingdom would ensure the Arab independence inside its borders asked by the Sharif of Mecca. But the United Kingdom did not want to prejudice the interests of France. Indeed, this argument was intentionally vague because Mc Mahon did not know until where were the French claims.\(^{19}\) Finally, the Arab should admit that the British Empire have to administrate the villayets of Bassorah and Bagdad to ensure the security and prosperity of these villayets.\(^{20}\) Mc Mahon exceeded his authority in this letter, forcing the Foreign Office to honor these heavy promises. However, Mc Mahon did what the Foreign Office requested to him. Furthermore, Mc Mahon did not know the existence of the Sykes-Picot negotiation until unofficially in March 1916.\(^{21}\)

Indeed, Mc Mahon took untenable promises to Arabs. The British side was not well prepared. In the different phases of negotiation theorized by Greenhalgh, Mc Mahon missed the preparation phase. He did not know the limits of his goals or some relevant information like the claims of France.\(^{22}\) The processual approach explained it by the articles of some authors like Lewicki.\(^{23}\) Sir Grey allowed Mc Mahon to negotiate without telling him what the British BATNA was. Consequently, Mc Mahon made his wishes his goals with vague limits. But during the information using phase, Mc Mahon said that all issues were not negotiable for the moment. And the Sharif Hussein did not insist enough, letting unresolved some discussions about territories claims. Moreover, in the Dual Concerns Model of Savage, Blair, and Sorenson, Mc Mahon adopted the collaboration strategy. He tried to create a good relationship with the Sharif Hussein. He showed a strong interest to see the Arab uprising happen, even it was nearly accommodating by guarantying an Arab State.\(^{24}\)

On 5 November 1915, Sharif Hussein answered to Mc Mahon. He renounced to the districts of Massine and Adana, but maintained his claims on the other territories like Beirut or Lebanon. On 13 December 1915, Mc Mahon answered to Sharif Hussein that discussions about Beirut and Lebanon were premature. On 13 January 1916, Sharif Hussein agreed, but emitted the reserve to discuss it again at the end of the war. On 30 January 1916, Mc Mahon felicitated the good will of Sharif Hussein. But his inaccurate answer let the Sharif mistrustful and waiting for more formal engagements.\(^{25}\)

\(^{19}\) HINSLEY Francis Harry, *op.cit.*, 702 p.
\(^{21}\) HINSLEY Francis Harry, *op.cit.*, 702 p.
If the agreements would have been concluded in this way, the Arab State would have covered a gigantic space as the map above shows. The Arab homeland should hold all the Arabia peninsula, the city of Jerusalem, and a territory claimed by the Sharif Hussein not well defined. But some zones like the Aden port or Bagdad are excluded because of their strategic position for the European powers. Finally the revolt occurred in June 1916 and the Sharif Hussein of Mecca became the king of new State of Hedjaz. During the negotiation, the Sharif Hussein asked several times for territorial gains that Mc Mahon postponed. Nevertheless, the Sharif Hussein accepted. According to Simon and Tripp, the Sharif Hussein was a soft bargainer who prioritized the issue. The most important issue was the guaranty of independence of an Arab State despite its size. He knew when he disputed territories claimed by the French, he reached a resistance point. Mc Mahon would have preferred to abandon the negotiation rather than tainting the French-British relations. But Arabs had no other alternatives than the British proposal to reach the independence. This independence objective guaranteed by the powerful British Empire was the target point of Sharif Hussein. And Sharif Hussein knew that the target point of Mc Mahon was the Arab uprising against

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the Ottoman Empire. Mc Mahon and he made the decision at the unanimity, because they had the will to act jointly at the agreement.

In parallel of the uprising, the British and French Empires were afraid of a possible national or Islamic uprising against the European powers. But, the Arabs did not see their potential power against the European armies already in difficulty before the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, these European Empires enthroned Fayçal, son of Hussein, on the Syria throne. They told him to maintain the region under the French protectorate. His limited control on Syria, and absent control on Lebanon were not in the agreement between the Europeans and the Sharif Hussein. Indeed, secret Sykes-Picot agreements occurred simultaneously between European Empires, sharing the Middle East.29

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The agreements on European Empires’ future acquisitions.

In spring 1916, the Triple Entente negotiated secretly the share of Middle East between them at the end of the war. These were the Sykes-Picot agreements ratified on 6 May 1916. Russia wanted to obtain Constantinople, Kars and Ardahan districts and a part of Persia. Italy would have received a part of Anatolia, Rhodes and the Dodecanese islands. The French Empire would have acquired the Cilicia, Syria and Lebanon. Finally, the British Empire would have obtained a part of Persia and Mesopotamia.\(^{30}\) But the United Kingdom and France plotted initially together. They were convinced of their prompt victory against the Ottomans. The British Sir Mark Sykes negotiated with the French Charles-François Georges-Picot to share the region between the Black Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Caspian Sea.\(^{31}\)

However, the French government and Sir Edward Grey, representative of Britain, already made an agreement on December 1912. In the future partition of Turkey, France reserved a zone with Syria included, while Britain reserved a zone of influence in Mesopotamia.\(^{32}\) These territories reserved a long time before constituted focal points for the future negotiations between Sir Sykes and Georges-Picot. Each of them knew which ground they desired.

On 17 April 1915, Sir Sykes proposed that Britain holds the ascendant on the territory from Haifa to Egypt, no matter the manner by which the Empires would control the region.\(^{33}\) In December 1915, Sir Sykes made a suggestion to Georges-Picot. Britain would have allowed a son of the Sharif Hussein to be Sultan of Mecca and the formation of a Zionist company in Palestine. And Britain would have arbitrated these two. Georges-Picot rejected violently the proposal.\(^{34}\) This proposal worried Grey and Nicholson, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office. Indeed, maintaining good relations with France was better for their opinion than some territorial gains in the Middle East.\(^{35}\) Heretofore, Sir Sykes and Georges-Picot had both an outcome frame over Palestine concerning their behavior. But the hierarchy of Sir Sykes mentioned its priority. Britain had to make more concessions in the objective to keep good relations with its ally. At this moment, the Sir Sykes’ managed his frame and transformed it. The reframe passed from an outcome frame to a process frame.\(^{36}\) In the dual concern model of Pruitt and Rubin, the strategy for conflict management is the “compromising”. Each one tried to pursue with a moderate effort its outcomes. They did not

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\(^{31}\) Sykes-Picot agreements

\(^{32}\) Bulletin du Comité de l’Asie française, August-November 1919, L’opinion anglaise et la Syrie.

\(^{33}\) « British Desiderata in Turkey in Asia », minutes of meeting of 17 April.

\(^{34}\) Buchanan’s telegram, St Petersburg, 14 March 1916.


want an escalation of the conflict, mainly Britain.\textsuperscript{37} In this case, Sir Sykes was a soft bargainer, and Georges-Picot was a hard bargainer.

Then, there are no written records of the negotiations. But Mark Sykes had prepared three maps with official memorandum. One of these maps name is presented below, “Turkey in Asia”, going with its memo: “Military Situation in Mesopotamia”. Made on 28 October 1915, these documents focused on strategic military defenses usable against Ottomans and Germans like the two other documents. These documents contained several orientalist discourses about the legitimate subordination of Muslims and propositions to gain their support against the Ottomans.\textsuperscript{38} The motivation of negotiators came from militaristic perspectives. They were interdependent to reach their goal. And their shared goal facilitated the cooperation between the two powers.\textsuperscript{39}

![Figure 4.5. Turkey in Asia, traced, 1915 (MPK 1/264).](image)

Georges-Picot and Mark Sykes released a first version in January 2016 of their agreement before releasing an update version later. During the two previous months, the objective of Sir Mark Sykes was to reduce the minimum French claims.\textsuperscript{40} Reaching agreements was easily most of the time. The negotiators’ behavior was inspired by their imperialistic mind. France wanted to obtain “La Grande Syrie”.\textsuperscript{41} The frame of negotiators shared together the frame of aspiration, because they shared the Arab territories to extend their empires. But they had together another frame which was diverging. In one hand, Georges-Picot had an outcome frame. His ambition concerned the acquisition of “La Grande

\textsuperscript{40} HINSLEY Francis Harry, \textit{op.cit.}, 702 p.
Syrie”. This last one was a big territory including a part of Palestine. In another hand, Sir Sykes had a process frame. One of his objectives was to maintain good relations with France, but without giving them disputed territories like Palestine. Britain did not want to let holy lands to laity France and so possessed a characterization frame about France. Consequently, the mismatches in the frames created sources of conflict. Hopefully, the process frame of British representatives permitted the good pursue of negotiations.\textsuperscript{42} Their disputes along all the negotiations showed the frame interest used. The negotiators spoke for their greedy Empire which needed extensions to satiate their interests.\textsuperscript{43}

French and British interests were delimited with the ‘Arab proposals’. The compromise was the following: “for France, compensation for inconvenience and loss attendant upon the disruption of the Ottoman Empire, which would safeguard her historic, traditional and economic interests and aspirations in the Near East and especially Syria; for the Arabs, recognition of their nationality, protection from alien oppression and ‘an opportunity of re-establishing their position as a contributing factor in the world’s progress’; for Britain, assurance of her position in the Persian Gulf and commercial and military land communication between the Gulf and the Mediterranean, and regarding religious beliefs, proper account to be taken of ‘the conscientious desires of Christianity, Judaism and Mahommedanism in regard to the status of Jerusalem and the neighboring shrines.’\textsuperscript{44}


\textsuperscript{44} HINSLEY Francis Harry, \textit{op.cit.}, p 448.
As it is showed on the map above, British inherited the area between Gaza to Persian frontier above Kirkuk. It had a direct control of the red zone of the map and a mandate on the zone B. French area lied above the British area with a direct control of the blue zone and a mandate of the zone A. The Palestine area was under an international control. The Arabian Peninsula and the Hejaz contained no spheres of influence, but British and French received some ports like Haifa, Acre and Alexandretta. The two Empires were intransigent about limits wanted, and they would have never let a third power inferred in the Arab Peninsula. But also they had to cede four towns for the creation of the Arab State, Homs, Hama, Aleppo and Damascus, which were in the French zone. Georges-Picot explained this problem and his ask of a compensation in a letter: “A lessening of our sovereignty over inland Syria should be compensated by an extension of our protectorate over the Arab lands on its eastern borders (Zor and Mosul), with the award of the Kirkuk oilfields also representing an element of this compensation.” So Britain gave Mosul to French in compensation to reach the zone of possible agreement, or ZOPA. By these means, Britain assured the French cooperation and ensured the Arab uprising they needed. On 17 January, These proposals were discussed again and the scheme was accepted on 4 February by a further inter-departmental discussion. This compensation showed a particular type of Sir Sykes’ behavior. This last one received the instruction to give priority to maintain good relations with France. His approach of the negotiation seemed risk averse, because Sir Sykes did not especially want to lose French cooperation.

With these compensations, the Admiralty and the War Office were furious and wanted to revise the agreement. Actually, the British forces held more and better positions compared to French armies. Whitehall wanted to put a protectorate over Palestine, including the port of Haifa. The Quai d’Orsay answered: “In exchange England would accept full French sovereignty over the villayet of Beirut and the inclusion of the Mosul region down to the Little Zab river in the French protectorate zone.” Moreover, as this memorandum went on to point out, “it is worthwhile to note that in the latter region there are important oil wells.” But the Little Zab river possessed few oil compared to Kirkuk wells. Cambon and Georges-Picot tried to extend the borders to include Kirkuk and its oil sites in the last minutes, but it did not work. The French representatives did not gather enough information about oil sites of the region. So it was too late to renegotiate in the phase where the little details were adjusted. Sykes and Georges-Picot established a draft memorandum of the agreement with a map. They signed it on 4 January 1916.

46 HINSLEY Francis Harry, op.cit., 702 p.
47 Briand to Cambon, “Question de Syrie”, 14 December 1915.
48 HINSLEY Francis Harry, op.cit., 702 p.
51 FITZGERALD Edward, op.cit., pp. 697-725.
However, the French claims extended on Russian zone of interests. And the French government agreed Britain to ask the consent of Russia on 9 February. The British ambassador, Sir George Buchanan told The Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonov, that the Anglo-French proposals were dependent of Russia consent. Sazonov saw it like a British attempt to create a buffer zone between Russia and English territory. He threatened to stir up the Lebanon Maronites to oppose the Arab movement. After negotiations, Russia demanded to France to stop its expansion at the line between Zakho to Biblis. It explained its disinterest for the Arab confederation as long as it obtained its claim of Constantinople. With the claims of Italy exposed previously, four European Powers wanted to share the Middle East. And another version of Sykes-Picot agreements map of 1916, presented below, showed the additional Italian and Russia claims.

Image: Sketch Map of Turkey in Asia, 1916 (MR 1/2014). This map also shows the Sykes-Picot agreement lines with the addition of Italian and Russian claims in Anatolia, but here the area around Alexandretta is a Italian influenced zone, instead on complete control.

On 6 May 1916, Sir Sykes and Georges-Pico ratified the Sykes-Picot agreements. And on 9 May 1916, the French government sent a letter to the Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey. It accepted the result of negotiations between Sir Mark Sykes and M. Georges-Picot. Several months were needed for the negotiations. According to Sheppard and Tuchinsky, a long time of negotiation improves the relationship and guides it to an integrative negotiation. Furthermore, France and Britain participated in the same side during the First

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52 HINSLEY Francis Harry, op. cit., 702 p.
54 French government to Edward Grey, 9 May 1916, 5 p.
World War against Germany. This alliance needed trust between its participants to be maintained. As explained in the McAllister work, the trust arouses the will to negotiate together on the base of the agreement. The relationship between Sir Sykes and Georges-Picot was based on a calculus-Based Trust. Consequently, the good distribution of goods between the two Empires was essential if a possible war occurred in the future. So their reputation entered in the game. The reputation was crucial to make agreements between the Empires because it might shape the next negotiations.

After the conclusion of these agreements, Lloyd George discovered that Sir Sykes would have let major economic territories to France like Mosul and its oil. Consequently, “Lloyd George voulut annuler le traité sous prétexte que la Russie, une des signataires, l’avait dénoncé.” But he obtained a private conversation with the French War Minister, Clemenceau, at the French embassy in London. No official record was made. On December 1918, Lloyd George succeeded convincing Clemenceau to renounce to Mosul. In return, France obtained a large part of Mosul oil from the Turkish Petroleum Company. The reason of Clemenceau to abandon French claims was a manner to avoid likely sources of friction. Moreover, France acquired Mosul oil, a strategic resource. Indeed in this case, Lloyd based his frame on the outcome because he absolutely desired Mosul. He thought the power of Britain led to the acquisition of the important city of Mosul. In return Clemenceau’s aspiration frame lied in the Middle East oil. So he ceded Mosul to maintain the preservation of the treaty.

Finally, the European Powers betrayed the Sharif of Mecca. They shared the same negotiating culture. As foreigners of Middle East, Britain and France imposed their mandates states. These ones functioned like colonies while the European Powers stressed the right of local peoples. But the establishment of statehood was considered a too important responsibility for the local population. The use of map was everything in the repartition of Ottoman territories after the First World War. The racist representations with the orientalism legitimated the domination of Arabs. The intentions during the negotiation were partly influenced by the colonialism culture and the oil. Moreover, the maps deluded the geopolitical views of the Middle East. They homogenized the space and the groups.

58 Sheppard Blair, Tuchinsky Marla, *op.cit.*, pp. 140-165.
60 La huitième croisade. Libre révélation d’un officier d’état-major britannique, Berlin : Maison internationale d’éditions, 1940.
63 Sheppard Blair, Tuchinsky Marla, *op.cit.*, pp. 140-165.
European Powers disputed this region which seemed geographically homogeneous for imperialist reasons.\(^65\)

**The absolute necessity of an Arab collaboration**

The British and French Empires were convinced to win quickly the war. But the British and French powers lost their battles against the Ottoman Empire. Defeated a first time in the Dardanelles, British men were defeated at Ctesiphon. The British and French Empire urged the need of an Arab collaboration with the aim to repel the Ottoman forces.\(^66\) So Mc Mahon negotiated again with the Sharif Hussein on the 14 July 1916, two months after the Sykes-Picot agreements signature. He announced the definitive recognition of Arab States by his Majesty’s Government. The Sharif of Mecca commanded his sons, Fayçal and Abdallah to raise an army to fight the Ottoman power. But he did not know the existence of the Sykes-Picot agreements, which were completely incompatible with the liberation of Arab territories.\(^67\)

Furthermore, the British and French Empire repeated their promises about the creation of an independent free Arab State during the war. Some examples were the declarations of general Stanley Maud on 11 March 1917 or the one of French Minister of foreign affairs Stephen Pichon on 2 May 1917. In the other side, the Arabs waited for their compensation. The Sharif Hussein became king of Hedjaz in the end of 1916.\(^68\)

In 1918, the Bolshevik government discovered the Sykes-Picot documents and informed the Turkey about the imperial policies of France and Britain. And Turkey transmitted the document to the king Hussein to discredit the European powers. By this, Turkey hoped the detachment of the Arab uprising and European powers and signed a separated peace with the Arabs.\(^69\) Hussein Ibn Ali asked explanations from Britain for the secret agreements. The British assured that the Sykes-Picot treaty was only an exchange of their point of view. Moreover the retreat of Russia of these documents invalided the agreements. But the Sharif of Mecca was not convinced by the explanations.\(^70\)

So the British government answered to the Sharif Hussein on 8 February 1918. It said that his majesty’s government and its allies kept on supporting the Arabs people in their willing of freedom from authoritarian Ottoman regime.\(^71\) On 30 October 1918, the defeated Turkey signed the armistice with the Allied Powers. The Ottoman Empire ceased existing and Britain made a joint statement with France. The two Empires stated the enfranchisement of

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\(^{65}\) CULCASI Karen, *op.cit.*, 384 p.
\(^{66}\) Groupe d’études et de recherches, *op.cit.*, p22.
\(^{67}\) Ibidem, p25.
\(^{68}\) Ibidem
\(^{71}\) Groupe d’études et de recherches, *op.cit.*, p. 25.
people oppressed by the Ottomans and the creation of national Governments and administrations according to the free will of indigenous. And finally, they would help at the establishment and the management of these Governments.\textsuperscript{72}

The Sharif Hussein jumped on an opportunity to ask his due. Because he identified the right moment with the Sykes-Picot agreements unveiled. But the Sharif Hussein did not change his attitude by returning the Arab uprising against the European traitors. This case showed well the dilemma of trust explained by Harold Kelley. Hussein, mistrustful vis-à-vis European Empires, had believed them in the beginning. He believed the promises of the other parties which took advantages. In the contrary, Britain succeeded the dilemma of honesty. British representative knew that saying the truth about European mandates would have not attracted Hussein. So he lied, even with the revelation of secret agreements. And Britain kept on taking the advantage on the Arabs.\textsuperscript{73} The Sharif Hussein saw the negotiation as a mutual gain situation when British government saw it as zero-sum situation.

These dilemmas can be resumed through the Game theory paradigm of Nash.\textsuperscript{74} The table below illustrates the strategic approach of the negotiation. This is the moment when Mc Mahon was asking the Arab uprising to the Sharif Hussein. Mc Mahon knew the existence of the Sykes-Picot agreement. This one gave to another powers what the Sharif Hussein was looking for. So if the British representative told the truth, no matter whether the Sharif Hussein believed him or not, he could not obtain the independence. The Strategy A would led to the cellule 1.A or 2.A. But if Mc Mahon lied about the creation of an independent Arab State with the strategy B, he might provoke the Arab uprising. In his side, the Sharif Hussein had two possibilities. If he chose the strategy 2, he rejected the alleged British lies but Arabs stayed anyway under Ottoman rule. But if he believed the British promises, he had a chance to free the Arabs. So the Sharif Hussein chose the strategy 1 and the result was the cell 1B: the Arab uprising and the Europeans fought the Ottoman power and expelled this last. Afterward, the European Empires took advantages on the Sharif of Mecca and his sons.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dilemma of trust / Sharif Hussein</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Dilemma of honesty / Brit. rep.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1) Trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>2) Distrust</td>
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<tr>
<td>A) Tell the truth</td>
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<td>1.A) End of negotiation</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.A) End of negotiation</td>
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<td>B) Lie</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.B) Arab uprising / Freed from Ottoman rule</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.B) End of negotiation</td>
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</tbody>
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\textsuperscript{72} Ibidem
\textsuperscript{73} KELLEY Harold, “A classroom study of the dilemmas in interpersonal negotiations”, in ARCHIBALD Kathleen (directed by), \textit{Strategic interaction and conflict}, Berkeley : Institute of International Studies, 1989.
\textsuperscript{74} NASH John F., “The bargaining problem”, \textit{Econometrica}, vol. XVIII, n°2, pp. 155-162.
Finally, the Balfour Declaration appeared on 2 November 1917. The king Faycal made an agreement with Weizmann, representative of the Zionist organization. Fayçal promised to respect the Balfour Declaration and accepted the Jew immigration in Palestine. In return, the Zionist organization engaged itself in the economic development of the new Arab State. The Weizmann-Fayçal agreements were sent on 4 January 1919 to Lord Balfour, but the British Government rejected the counterproposal. This reject annihilated all the promises done to Arabs during the First World War. After that, on 26 April 1920, the San Remo conference formalized the distribution of Arab zones between France and Great Britain according to the Sykes-Picot agreements.

Conclusion

In 1917, the British Empire did not respect the Sykes-Picot agreements because it wanted to control the Mosul and Palestinian oil fields. The European empires were looking for the extension of their influences. Then, they buried the promise done to Arabs. Lord Balfour told Rothshild the favorable opinion of Britain about the establishment of Jew homeland in Palestine. But it’s only in 1920, during the San Remo conferences, the Sykes-Picot agreements were formalized and applied immediately. So the king Fayçal was expelled from Syria by the French Empire and the Arabs representatives were full of hatred against the treachery of British Empire.

Then, the manners how the parties negotiated revealed the European connivance against the Sharif of Mecca. During several years, all the actors negotiated with willingness according the characteristics of Lewicki. The negotiations occurred between governments of different States through their representatives. During the conflicts, the Triple Entente was looking for allies and searched for agreements with them. The parties chose to participate by will at negotiations, because they could reach a better position in the systemic system by the intermediary of the treaty. Britain asked the Arabs to revolt against the Ottoman power. The Arabs accepted after making a compromise with Britain, because they were thinking they could reach independence. All the actors were interdependent because they needed each other to reach their objectives. Arabs needed Britain support to reach their independence and the Allied Powers needed an Arab uprising to fight the ally of Germany. The objective was to expel the Ottoman forces from Middle East. However, Britain and France negotiated simultaneously to take the Middle East territories. In fact, Britain knew a integrative situation vis-à-vis Arabs, because Britain promised the creation of an Arab State. But Britain

76 SEMICHI Nabila, op.cit., 168 p.
transformed it in a distributive situation, because it negotiated with France in an integrative negotiation to acquire the territories promised.

In the negotiation processes showed in the paper, the negotiators valued the entry in war and the possession of territories. According to Lax and Sebenius, their differences resided in the interests and goals. The powers negotiated the cost of entry in a war against territorial gains. And during the negotiations, few conflicts appeared between the representatives. Their interdependence in their objectives resolved easily the interpersonal conflicts. The Europeans had already defined their stakes. They acted as they were in positive sum situation. And when some lands were reserved to several actors, Britain pursued its own interest. Britain and France knew each other much longer than Britain and the Arab representatives.

Indeed, each approach from negotiation theories explained a view of these years of negotiation. The structural approach explained the realist exchanges between the parties. The actors were looking for means to increase their power. And a war was the occasion to obtain spoils and new territories based on the ratio of power among the participants. Then, the strategic approach showed the rational tactics followed by the actors. In fact, Mc Mahon did not know initially the existence of Sykes-Picot agreements. But when he knew, he continued the lie. European armies needed the help of Arabs against the Ottomans forces. Consequently, to ensure the Arab cooperation, the British representative told to the Sharif Hussein what he wanted to hear. Concerning the Sykes-Picot agreements, the processual and behavioral approach explained the proceeding of negotiations. Sir Sykes received the instruction to maintain good relations with France as a priority. While Georges-Picot was focusing on the pursuit of outcomes. Finally, the cultural approach relates the proximity between Britain and France compared to Britain and the Sharif of Mecca. The negotiations were essentially based on maps where European representatives could easily decide the partitions. The imperial culture assumed the establishment of European mandates on Arab lands. Because the Arab population was not considered as sufficiently responsible to decide the future of Middle East administration.

In the end, even with the exaggerated promises of Mc Mahon about the independent Arab State, Britain met its expectations during the negotiation. The Arab uprising repelled the Ottoman forces and the freed territories were shared between France and Britain. The interests of two allied European Empires overtook the Arab right of self-determination. Britain kept its oath in the agreement ensuring it more interests on detriment of Arab world stability.

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