FINAL PAPER:

THE YALTA CONFERENCE OF 1945: AN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION CASE

Travail réalisé par
Marcos Enrique Romero Tejada

Code cours
LSPRI2300

Intitulé du cours
Valérie B. Rosoux

Année académique
2015-2016

Master et finalité
Science Politique, orientation Relations Internationale, finalité Diplomatie et Résolution des Conflits

Références portfolio : http://tinyurl.com/k4nfmzx (voir point 2.3. du vade mecum portfolio)
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

I-INTRODUCTION

II-THE YALTA CONFERENCE BACKGROUND

III-BEHAVORIAL AND CULTURAL APPROACH

3.1 Joseph V. Stalin (1878-1953)

3.2 Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882-1945)

3.3 Winston Churchill (1874-1965)

IV-STRUCTURAL AND STRATEGIC APPROACH

4.1 Great Britain Position

4.2 URSS Position

4.3 United States Position

V-PROCESSUAL APPROACH

VI-CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDIX
I-INTRODUCTION

The Yalta Conference has been considered as the pinnacle of wartime diplomacy and by others as the most important conference of all time, as it was related to postwar order\(^1\). In consequence, the Yalta Conference is an emblematic case study of multilateral negotiation that could shows the nature of the individual context and personalities of the actors involved in the negotiation, the capacities to influence of each other, in a way to reach their goals, and a complex bargaining process.

So far, four different aspects need to be ascertained to uncover the Yalta conference as case on international negotiation. The influence of the parties’ life experiences (Behavior), the parties position (Structure), the standing and the outcomes expected by the parties (strategies), the elasticity of the negotiation stages (Processes). However, the cultural approach of the negotiation is going to be mention but in less proportion, as the results of the Yalta conference could be seen as a success, considering the fact that cooperation was achieved between the Three Big, despite their opposing ideological interests.

For this paper I will make a qualitative research, based on deductive reasoning, meaning that I should begin with the study of certain theoretical framework in relation to different negotiation approaches. Then, I analyze and define the nature of the “Big Three” during the Yalta conference. There are two important officials’ bibliographical sources: First, the “Final Statement”, just at the end of the Yalta Conference, which concern only a part of the agreements that, by the moment, were kept in secret for diplomatic and strategic reasons. The second one is the “Conference Protocol” published by the US State Department which has been established by the three power’s Foreign Relations Ministers. Nevertheless, I have used different bibliographic sources, like books, dissertations and academics papers concerning the Yalta Conference.

\(^1\) Furthermore, the Yalta Conference is considered for the international relations history as the “World Share” between the Big Three.
II. THE YALTA CONFERENCE BACKGROUND

The Crimea Conference best known as the “Yalta Conference”, was held during eight days, from February 04 to February 11 of 1945, between the “Big Three”: the president of the United States Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill and the USSR Marshal Joseph Stalin.

Yalta is a region of about 80 kilometers long on the southern coast of Crimea. This place has been chosen by the Soviet Union because it offers in the season the best climate in the Soviet Union (February). Overall Yalta was devastated by war so the Russians delegates have had to restore all the buildings to welcome the thousands of dignitaries. It is Stalin who has prepared the residences of the three delegations. It has reserved for Americans the Livadia Palace (SEE APPENDIX 2), for the British the Vorontsov villa, and for the Russians Koreis villa. The Livadia palace is a large building with a white facade, with oriental and rococo style. Livadia (village) is a small town with a beach located three kilometers from Yalta. Stalin took the decision to separate English and American delegations, in this way to avoid that they could communicate and reach a common position against Russia. The date was not improvised, because at that time the US military and imperial forces had achieved great victories in the French campaign. However, Roosevelt was in somewhat more relaxed after the victory post-election period. At the same time, Stalin knew that by the time of the Conference, his troops would be occupying the whole Poland, which would be in a favorable position to deal.

The main worries and points of interest throughout the Yalta conference can be divided as follow: a) The Polish Question; b) The future of Germany (Germany’s dismemberment, occupation and control); b) The “Declaration on Liberated Europe” (the conditions for the Free European countries reconstruction); c) The conditions for the entry of the Soviet Union into war with Japan; d) The organization of the world based on the cooperation with the constitution of the United Nations Organization.

III-BEHAVIORAL AND CULTURAL APPROACH IN THE YALTA CONFERENCE

Behavioral analysis uses the negotiator as the analytical variable. By Zartman this approach is the oldest and most persistent and it has to face a serious of conceptual challenges as a basis for analysis, while takes individuals into a meaningful behavioral category. First, the basis dichotomy of the previous century has been repeated in many forms, notably as “hardliners” and “soft-liners”. Then, the recent and complex attends divides personalities into five categories and each personality is related to an appropriate strategy for situations of transaction, to a tacit cooperation, relationships, and balance.

---

3 Ibid. P. 192
4 Ibid. P. 193
5 Ibid. P. 194
7 Competitor (shark), avoider (tuttle), accommodator (teddy bear), collaborator/problem solver (owl), and compromiser (fox) (Thomas and Kilman-1975).
concerns. In others words, personalities are considered as key element to resolution and non resolution of a conflict by negotiation, but their categorization still remains elusive\textsuperscript{8}.

In the second place, I could ask, does culture has an impact in the negotiation process? Is there any issue regarding the Interpretation given to the past in the Yalta conference. The “culture” can be applied and to indentify negotiating traits that are cross-cultural compared to those that are intrinsic, although culture is considered as a delicate variable on which to hang an analysis of process and outcomes\textsuperscript{9}. The negotiation should not be regarded as a process with an end but rather as the beginning of a process of continuing cooperation.\textsuperscript{10} However, the cultural approach of the negotiation is going to be mention but in less proportion, as the results of the Yalta conference could be seen as a success, considering the fact that cooperation was achieved between the Three Big, despite their opposing ideological interests.

3.1 Joseph V. Stalin (1878-1953)

Joseph V. Stalin was defined as a suspicious person. Stalin was extraordinarily suspicious of everyone around him.\textsuperscript{11} Psychological analysis from a far is dubious, but it is clear that the autocrat’s upbringing and rise to power left him less trusting than his Big Three counterparts. The Marshal became a secretive person who he never told anyone his true intentions\textsuperscript{12}. So, the control over those around him was his way of overcoming his distrust of people. As a result, power, not nationalism, nor idealism, nor even revolutionary zeal, drove Stalin. Furthermore, after Vladimir Lenin’s death, the Soviet leader slowly worked to his ultimate aim – unchecked power\textsuperscript{13}. Mathew Grossberg\textsuperscript{14} explains that Stalin thought his domestic tactics and policies could be transferred to the international arena. His security scheme planning, domestically and internationally, was based on the principles of eliminate those who could potentially rise up against him or create independent power bases and hold strategic points.

However, Stalin alarmed by the German revival under Western capitalist auspices, regarded the prospective United Nations Organization as one promising form of exorcism. In sum, Stalin was drawn toward the formative world Organization as a potential check on the formation of a bloc between German and North Atlantic capitalism, and at the same time feared the prospective Organization as a predominantly capitalist association.

3.2 Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882-1945)

Franklin D. Roosevelt used lessons from the past to guide his future actions. His education under the tutelage of Endicott Peabody and the events surrounding the failure to ratify the League of Nations Covenant guided his thoughts about the postwar order. Peabody was the headmaster at Gorton where

\textsuperscript{9} Ibid
\textsuperscript{11} FELIX CHUEV, \textit{Molotov; Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics Conversations with Felix Chuev}, trans. Albert Resis (Chicago: I.R. Dee, 1993), 224 cited by GROSSBERG Mathew M., \textit{Yalta, a Tripartite Negotiation to Form the Post-World Order: Planning for the conference, The Big Three’s Strategies, a thesis Submitted for the Degree Master of Arts in the Department of History Indiana University, Indiana, United States, August 2015.} P. 31
\textsuperscript{13} GROSSBERG Mathew M., \textit{Op. Cit.} P. 31
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid. P. 37
FDR was boarded as a youth. The headmaster preached civil service and the duty of the Christian community, especially those born into prosperous circumstance, to help the less fortunate (Noblesse Oblige). The headmaster’s beliefs influenced FDR’s thinking about state-to-state relations.\textsuperscript{15}

On the other hand, just three months before the Yalta Conference, Franklin D. Roosevelt, was elected for the fourth time as President of the United States. Whereupon he made a devastating electoral campaign and the summer of 1944 has been filled with difficult events and with great concerns for the United States, such as the Normandy landing among others. During that period Roosevelt’s health has steadily worse, especially after the trip to Tehran in December 1943, where he had contracted an infection, in addition to his cardiac problems aggravated by its former disability caused by polio\textsuperscript{16}. What’s more, Robert Macneal\textsuperscript{17} explains that President Roosevelt was as much misunderstood by Stalin as Stalin was by the President. Roosevelt was hoping to overcome such ideological preconceptions. There were doubts in Stalin’s mind concerning the President's position as a bourgeois reformist; they were surely dispelled by Roosevelt himself in the further course of the table talk at Yalta. Against this background it is not hard to understand the failure of the President's purely personal gestures aimed at overcoming Stalin's reserve.\textsuperscript{18} For example, in attempting to establish rapport with Stalin the President repeatedly emphasized his detachment from Churchill and British policy, especially the maintenance of the Empire. In this Stalin's preconceptions most likely led him to perceive Roosevelt's intention as its opposite\textsuperscript{19}.

3.3 Winston Churchill (1874-1965)

Winston Churchill was gifted of a quick intelligence, a great vitality at the same time he used his eloquence, allowing him to success in the negotiations. In short, it was considered a very talented leader. Although Funk\textsuperscript{20} interprets that Winston Churchill was accused to have an anachronistic view of the British Empire. In addition, Winston Churchill was seventy years old and had suffered a pneumonia that nearly cost him his life. On the other hand, Funk\textsuperscript{21} explained Winston Churchill, had been an opponent of the communist doctrine, so, the British Prime Minister regarded Russia as a colossal rival, capable of extending its tentacles towards the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Suez Canal, India and Hong Kong, that is, all the territories of the British Empire. However, he has not hesitated during the War of welcoming Russia as a great ally. The PM wanted an American partnership, but he also wanted to sustain the prewar setup of the Empire and a regional UNO. He thought the Anglo-American “natural kinship” and fears of communism could bind the countries together, but Roosevelt was not afraid of, in fact, US needed the Russians. These tensions were at the heart of Anglo-American differences over the next eighteen months leading up to Yalta. In hindsight, especially using Cold War patterns, Anglo-American differences seem trite and that they could and should have been overcome; however, FDR and Churchill held divergent visions of how the postwar world should be formed. These different outlooks shaped how the two men sifted through and decided amongst the choices available.

\textsuperscript{15} GROSSBERG Mathew M., \textit{Op. Cit.} P. 37
\textsuperscript{17} MACNEAL Robert H. \textit{Roosevelt through Stalin’s Spectacles}, in International Journal, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Spring, 1963), P. 202.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid
\textsuperscript{20} FUNK, Arthur. \textit{op.cit.} P.17
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid
IV-STRUCTURAL AND STRATEGIC APPROACH IN THE CONFERENCE OF YALTA

Structure refers to the relative position of perceived power of the parties. However, for Zatman\textsuperscript{22} it is known that a “sense” of equality or symmetry is beneficial to the efficient and effective achievement of results, and negotiators should cultivate that sense. Although, symmetry is no existent in the real world because all negotiations are asymmetrical, to greater or lesser degree, moreover, parties that are assumed as equals will spend much of their time protecting that equality or seeking to overturn it in their favor.

Weaker parties have potential array of means to reduce the degree of asymmetry, by borrowing power from third parties, opponents, context, and process. Weaker parties also tend to overcome their power deficit by emphasizing commitment on a single issue whereas larger parties are burdened by many issues. Since power could be characterized as “resources-skill-will”, commitment emphasizes the last element over the first. So commitment could returns the negotiation setting to its formal equality, in which party holds a veto; and other element in which could be underline the commitment is justice, for this reason parties hold their cause to be just, and negotiators have been known to turn down deals offered by stronger parties\textsuperscript{23}.

Between the inability unilaterally to end the conflict or solve the problem and the decision to negotiate lies a large area of indecision, dominated by the cost of alternatives above all the cost of continued conflict or unsolved problems. The cost/benefit value of what a party can obtain could be named as best/worst alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA/WATNA), which is the most important reference point in understanding an conducting a negotiation. It is the source of relative power and determines whether a party can play it though or soft negotiation\textsuperscript{24}. So I could as if did the balance of power evolve during The Yalta Conference? To describe the Yalta conference in terms of balance of power between the parties, even more when the scenario of the WWII were in constant changing, and the USSR was gaining territory in the military campaign against Germany.

4.1-Great Britain Position

At the time of the Yalta Conference, the English people were exhausted by five years of war and superhuman efforts. The country's economy was on the verge of collapse. The United States criticized over the policy followed by the English in Italy and Greece, and did not seem convinced of the need for an Anglo - American unity. The two powers seemed to act more and more on their own, and decrease each day Churchill saw their chances to influence us about the direction of movement\textsuperscript{25}. As for the United States, Winston Churchill signed Terra Nova the Atlantic Charter, which, England agrees to stop its territorial expansionist aspirations, opposing border modifications not according to the wishes of the affected populations, to recognize the right of peoples to dispose of themselves or self-determination, and defend free access to the world's wealth. According to the vision of the United States, all that should be capitalism, democracy and free trade\textsuperscript{26}. Thus, the negotiation reality was that Britain was the junior

\textsuperscript{22} BERCOVITH Jacob, KREMENYUK and ZARTMAN Willian, Op. Cit. P. 325.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid. P. 326
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid. P. 325
\textsuperscript{25} FUNK, Arthur, op.cit. P.17
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid. P.15
partner, in all matters, by the time the vast majority of the decisions affecting the postwar world started to take place – the conferences of 1943. It is harder to assess the standing between the Russians and Americans. This assessment is made more difficult because the Russians based their thinking about standing on military prowess. The Americans, on the other hand, saw it through an economic lens.  

Sustaining British geo-political standing through a balance of power setup, therefore, was the most powerful influence on the PM’s postwar planning. A re-adaptation of the Concert’ makeup, based on three powers (UK, US, USSR) seemed the best mechanism to reestablish a European balance of power. As will be detailed, it was more than just a Big Three triumvirate that Churchill desired; he felt he must act as the triumvirate’s intermediary to compensate for Britain’s lack of standing amongst the group. Like the Concert period, Churchill felt the British would need to work with the Russians to forestall American ambitions. However, similar to the late Concert period, one of the powers (in that case France) was clearly the ideal partner for most instances due to their complementary setup to the British Empire – America.  

4.2-URSS Position  

To Stalin, the strength of the Red Army that will achieve the maintenance of the supremacy of the Communist Party, the reconquest of lost territories, safeguarding national independence, the return of the Soviet Union as a military power, and above all safety its borders. But during the war Britain had weakened and at the end of the war was clear that the balance of forces had been reversed. Therefore, Stalin was in a position in which he could foresee concrete actions to achieve their goals, while formulating the most important objectives.  

The Russian superiority in troops gave them the top slot amongst the Big Three. However, the Red Army could only fight with supplies from the Americans. Still, after 1943 the Russians became less dependent on American aid, ironically at the moment that shipments were finally being fully delivered. The best way to view Soviet and American standing, therefore, is to think of them as 1 (the Russians) and 1a (the Americans), superior to the British but with a distinct advantage for the Soviets. They were dependent on either soldiers or supplies that the other possessed but the Americans more so and the Russians less so as the war progressed. With anger, not credit, accrued from the first years of supplying aid due to Britain’s maneuvering, the leverage amassed by the Americans was far less than Roosevelt had hoped to achieve.  

Stalin also contextualized his options through the viewpoint of his underlying interest – the preservation of his power. Plus, as will be detailed, he “certainly did not intend to allow Britain to act as an intermediary between her and the United States of America.”  

---

28 Ibid. P. 25  
30 Ibid  
31 GROSSBERG Mathew M., Op. Cit. P. 74
The Marshal’s determination to separate Anglo-American planning was born of the suspicions created as a result of British maneuverings. These misgivings caused Stalin to evolve his positions. Now, on top of his minimal conditions, Western concurrence with the establishment of his security sphere on his Western and Northeastern frontiers was desired. He would pursue Anglo-American agreement to his security sphere throughout the conferences of 1943. Roosevelt’s similar desire to separate Western planning would help facilitate Soviet and American movement towards one another during these meetings\(^{32}\).

On February 4, on the eve of the Yalta Conference, Stalin made respective visits to Winston Churchill and Franklin Delano Roosevelt, expressing the progress of the Red Army in front of Eastern Europe, including the Balkans, Italy and northern Greece. Moreover let them know of the possibility that the Russian Navy can accomplish the capture of Berlin. In return, Roosevelt informs Stalin that Eisenhower, is far from able to make the final assault on the capital of the Reich, i.e., that American troops will not cross the Rhine before March\(^ {33}\). In addition within two months, the Red Army could liberate Czechoslovakia and Hungary, so on the political plan, it would occupy regions that interest, and on the military plan, the Red Army would create a base that would allow it on Berlin, progressing simultaneously from the East and from the South\(^ {34}\). Even more, the Russians negotiated agreements that gave them the prime bargaining position moving forward but were unable to capitalize on this advantage. Written agreements favorable to their ends were obtained, i.e., the options chosen were beneficial to their objectives. However, the Soviets did not finalize these agreements in a manner that upheld or advanced these gains. Reparations were the embodiment of their failure to capitalize on the advantageous results at Yalta. The Soviet’s assumed they had achieved success on the issue by convincing the West to acquiesce to the Russian’s $10 billion figure as the basis of reparation discussions. Yet, they soon found out an issue is not settled until the agreement is implemented. With security as the foremost priority, at Potsdam, Stalin reluctantly conceded large-scale reparations to maintain his gains in Eastern Europe. Working together at the conference, the Anglo-Americans left the Russians with no other option but to choose either security (maintenance of their gains in Eastern Europe) or reparations. With the former reflecting their underlying interest, Stalin conceded any claim to large-scale reparations\(^ {35}\).

- United State Position

The Americans emerged from WWII as the preeminent world power partly because they were left virtually untouched by the war. However, the US achieved this status primarily because they never moved from hard positions (detailed momentarily) during the postwar planning negotiations. Though the Americans made a number of concessions, some in a magnitude greater than necessary, they never conceded their hard positions – the United Nations Organization (UNO) founded on American concepts and principles as well as Washington’s control over international commercial (multilateral free trade) and monetary (dollar-based world economy) policy. Despite the American right’s myths about a sellout of Eastern Europe, it was “not an area in which the United States Government wished to participate,”

\(^{32}\) GROSSBERG Mathew M., Op. Cit. P. 74


\(^{34}\) Ibid, P.39

\(^{35}\) GROSSBERG Mathew M., Op. Cit. P. 5
nor did the region encompass their vital interests, recalled Britain’s wartime ambassador to the US, Lord Halifax.\footnote{Paul Preston, Michael Partridge, and Richard Crockatt, \textit{British Documents On Foreign Affairs--Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential Print}. Part III, \textit{From 1940 Through 1945. Series C North America}, 5 vols. (Bethesda, MD: University Publications of America, 1998), (hereafter referred to as FO: North American), vol. IV, 392.) cited by GROSSBERG Mathew M., \textit{Op. Cit.} P. 4} The British who had to concede on international commercial and monetary policy and the Russians on reparations, however, did move from hard positions. The Americans’ lack of movement on these positions allowed them to instill their socio-economic concepts worldwide and emerge from the war as the Premier world power\footnote{GROSSBERG Mathew M., \textit{Op. Cit.} P. 4}.

Britain would try to undermine the multilateral trade and decolonization aspects of the International New Deal. Plus, the American version of the UNO would forestall a balance of power setup. Equally important, FDR felt he had to make it “clear to Stalin that the United States and Great Britain were not allied in one common bloc against the Soviet Union.”\footnote{Roosevelt, \textit{As He Saw It}, 207.; cited by GROSSBERG Mathew M., \textit{Yalta, a Tripartite Negotiation to Form the Post-World Order: Planning for the conference, The Big Three’s Strategies}, a thesis Submitted for the Degree Master of Arts in the Department of History Indiana University, Indiana, United States, August 2015. P. 70} Alleviating Russian fears cultivated by the delays in supplies and the second front was essential to obtaining Russian adherence to the American vision of the postwar world.

In the wake of Soviet military victories, Roosevelt at last decided it was time issues which had postponed for three years. The Yalta Conference met with a sense of deliberation. It was to be the test of the ability of the three nations to resolve the issues dividing them. It was a moment when United States ideology, usually submerged in moralistic phrases uncharacteristic of its actual behavior, was submitted to a traditional negotiating experience with binding results. Roosevelt and Churchill, when they met personally with Stalin, tended to treat the Soviet Union as the nation it was, an existing state with increasing influence in world affairs. The decision at Yalta involved compromise by each nation, probably more for the Soviets than by the Western Nations\footnote{CLEMENS, Diane Shaver. \textit{Yalta}, Oxford University Press :New York, 1970. P. 290}.

The goal of the International New Deal was to export what Charles Maier has termed the “politics of productivity,” which promoted “a supposedly impartial efficiency.” The plan was “to transform political issues into problems of output,” which could be more readily visualized and solved.\footnote{CHARLES MAIER, “The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of Americans International Economic Policy after World War II” in \textit{International Organization}, 31, no. 4, (Autumn 1977), P. 607. Cited by GROSSBERG Mathew M., \textit{Op. Cit.} P. 39} New markets and greater world purchasing power would result from the tapping of the world’s latent potential, which would increase its economic stability and, therefore, promote worldwide security. At the same time these countries would orient themselves towards the US increasing America’s economic vitality. Thus, the underlying interest guiding FDR’s postwar planning was spreading his concepts of liberal capitalism typified by the New Deal\footnote{GROSSBERG Mathew M., \textit{Op. Cit.} P. 36}.

\textbf{Roosevelt} wanted to usher in long-term peace by remaking international institutions, especially world commerce, along American institutional lines based on American socio-economic principles – the International New Deal. Directing the victorious allies’ transition to peace would offer the President the
opportunity to install these institutions. When FDR’s underlying interest is taken into account, it is clear he wanted to decrease British influence on American planning and Soviet perceptions of said influence on US planning to accomplish this goal.

The implementation of American free-trade, an international Export-Import Bank, and American control of relief and rehabilitation would lay the foundation for the International New Deal. American institutions and socio-economic principles would provide the guide for the great powers to act as Good Neighbors. The Good Neighbor Policy had shown the success of Export-Import loans, especially in facilitating the establishment of American-styled institutions. Fomenting the creation of similar economic foundations meant the aided country would orient their economy towards the United States.

-The standing and the outcomes expected by the parties

Arthur Funk, understands that the task of Roosevelt at Yalta, was to secure the good will of Stalin, as the plan of a world order maintained by Russia, China, Britain and the United States, seemed impracticable, claims that Russia accepts a institutional structure, ie the United Nations. In other words, your main goal is to persuade Stalin to approve the draft of the UN Charter, tuning in "Dubarton's Oaks".

Second, Roosevelt wanted to usher in long-term peace by remaking international institutions, especially world commerce, along American institutional lines based on American socio-economic principles – the International New Deal. Directing the victorious allies’ transition to peace would offer the President the opportunity to install these institutions. When FDR’s underlying interest is taken into account, it is clear he wanted to decrease British influence on American planning and Soviet perceptions of said influence on US planning to accomplish this goal. The implementation of American free-trade, an international Export-Import Bank, and American control of relief and rehabilitation would lay the foundation for the International New Deal. American institutions and socio-economic principles would provide the guide for the great powers to act as Good Neighbors. The Good Neighbor Policy had shown the success of Export-Import loans, especially in facilitating the establishment of American-styled institutions. Fomenting the creation of similar economic foundations meant the aided country would orient their economy towards the United States.

On the one hand Winston Churchill aims to stay on good terms with both the United States and the USSR. But above all it is with the United States prefers to keep an alliance, under the historical destiny of the Anglo-Saxon peoples and at the same time is aware of the economic potential of the United States. The underlying interest that informed all British decision-making was the maintenance of their great power status. There exists a “difference between expressed positions (demands) and underlying interests (actual needs),” declares Cohen.

42 GROSSBERG Mathew M., Op. Cit. P. 40
44 GROSSBERG Mathew M., Op. Cit. P. 40
46 GROSSBERG Mathew M., Op. Cit. P. 70
On the other hand, it aims to ensure the safety of Britain to the East, so this in favor of a strong France, which must be reset. Consequently, this rearmament of France would only be possible during the war, thanks to the United States, the only one able to do this. In other words you want France to again play a role of great world power, thanks to a chair in the European Advisory Commission, a role in the decision making process in the United Nations. And to achieve these objectives puts into play all his persuasiveness.\(^{47}\)

Finally, Russian strategy was based on trading their adherence to the Western delegation’s greatest concerns in return for dominance over Eastern Europe and the Northern Far East endorsed by the UNO under a Big Three triumvirate. Britain’s fear of the Red Army’s power in Europe and the US need for these troops in the Pacific provided Stalin the leverage believed he could use to secure Anglo-American agreement to his security scheme.\(^{48}\)

**The URSS National security imperatives were:** Primarily to ensure the territories obtained during the war, considered strategic points, namely, Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, the eastern part of Poland and Belarus. at the same time, it must have friendly governments in neighboring countries, particularly in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria\(^{49}\). Stalin supports any measure that tends to contribute to the weakening of Germany, its defeated enemy, while it is decided to prevent the return of Germany as a military power, thanks to its dismemberment. In addition to the USSR claims the payment of reparations for damages suffered during the war\(^{50}\).

**VI-PROCESSUAL APPROACH:**

The process of a negotiation displays a dynamic momentum; decisions build upon themselves, reducing options and at the same time defining how the parties viewed the available alternatives. A realistic way to consider Yalta as a traditional diplomatic negotiation situation, removed from its emotionally context. Toward the end of the war several issues were unilaterally resolved by the different parties. Then, at Yalta the Three Powers thrashed out their perspective on these issues. As have been said before, there were five mains issues at Yalta, three of them problems related to a German settlement. It seems useful to recapitulate the process on reaching a decision on the issues in terms of what each party sought to accomplish by their negotiating positions. In this some conclusions can be reached as to the reasonableness of the decisions and negotiating stances of the three nations of the three at this three partite meeting\(^{51}\). The Conference functioned reasonably on the basis of balanced diplomatic interaction. *To better understand the complexity of the negotiating process in the Yalta conference negotiation is possible to describe various stages, as the moments of concessions, when there are adjustments of the argumentations and agreements.*

Agreement between two parties tended to assure agreement of the third, even when the third party was reluctant, in brief (See Appendix 1):

---


\(^{50}\) Ibid, P.14

- Stalin used Roosevelt’s support for dismemberment and reparations, and his agreement to an expansion of the Lublin committee as the basis for the government of Poland;

- British support for admission of two Soviet Republics to the United Nation led Roosevelt (by his own administration) to accept a proposal;

- Stalin’s acquiescence to a Zone for France in Germany promptly followed a shift by Roosevelt to the same position.

- When it seemed that Britain would accept the American voting formula in the United Nations, Stalin also concurred.

A review of the content of original proposals, compare with subsequent proposals and final agreements, indicates that the Soviet Union in particular tended to incorporate compromises and suggestions in order to achieve agreement. This indicates that the Soviet Union tended to incorporate compromises and suggestions in order to achieve agreement.

-During the Conference, the United States and the Soviet Union made six major proposals on the prime topics and Britain made five.

-On the five topic listed on the chart, the Soviet Union took the initiative on two issues, both on Germany and eventually a third, on Poland (although the first proposal came from Roosevelt).

-United States took the initiative on one issue, and Britain on one.

What kind of processes could be applied to the Yalta conference negotiations? - is there any turning point when the parties decide to make concession, during the negotiations. Through these procedures the British harnessed the momentum of the negotiation process affecting how the Americans and Russians viewed the postwar planning alternatives. It is, therefore, revealed how the procedures used allowed the actors to control the process by directing its momentum. Furthermore, it is revealed how the process controlled the actors by limiting their options as the negotiation progressed. However, by pursuing different agendas, the PM and Eden eventually were unable to employ these tactics effectively because one of their use of the tactics worked against the other’s employment of them.

The British framed the options available at the tripartite negotiations to reflect their preferred positions by entering into bilateral understandings (verbal or non-specific written agreements) with the Soviets and, more often, the Americans through acting as the Big Three’s intermediary. “Framing refers to the mental structure,” notes David de Cremer and M.M. Pillutla, “which we use to make the situation in question more readily understandable and accessible.” These tactics weakened the bargaining power of the Soviets and Americans and defined how the options available were perceived when the Grand Alliance met at the tripartite conferences…. due to presenting the issues to one party at a time (acting as

---

53 Ibid
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
an intermediary) and entering into bilateral understandings (framing) the British were able to channel
the process of the negotiations and thus created the context for the postwar planning diplomacy.\textsuperscript{58}

Their exploitation of the process through the shrewd use of the procedures (tactics) granted British
positions more authority than their standing (often called prestige) should have afforded them had all
three parties determined the course to be taken simultaneously. This progression eventually fostered an
outcome by which most of their traditional interests were protected.

At Yalta, the Russians negotiated agreements that gave them the prime bargaining position moving
forward but were unable to capitalize on this advantage. Written agreements favorable to their ends were
obtained, i.e., the options chosen were beneficial to their objectives. However, the Soviets did not
finalize these agreements in a manner that upheld or advanced these gains. Reparations were the
embodiment of their failure to capitalize on the advantageous results at Yalta. The Soviet’s assumed
they had achieved success on the issue by convincing the West to acquiesce to the Russian’s $10 billion
figure as the basis of reparation discussions.\textsuperscript{59}

According with Diane Shaver Clemens, the only realist way to consider Yalta is a traditional diplomatic
negotiating situation, removed from its emotionally charged context. There were five mains issues\textsuperscript{60} that
took up most of the time in Yalta, three of them problems related to a German settlement. From the
decisions that were made at Yalta indicates that several conclusions can be made about the Conference
as a tripartite negotiating experience. Nevertheless each Power differed in their initial point of view; a
high incidence of consensus was reached at the Conference. The Allied coalition, which had been at first
of military in nature, produced at last an incentive to nonmilitary agreement along all three parties-
based on the assumption that consensus was in the interest of each of the parties. As a matter of fact,
each nation had an issue of prime importance to it, and each gained support from the others two allies.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{58} GROSSBERG Mathew M., \textit{Op. Cit.} P. 2
  \item \textsuperscript{59} Ibid. P. 3
  \item \textsuperscript{60} Reparation, the dismemberment of Germany, the immediate postwar role of France, questions relating Poland and
decisions relating the United Nations.
\end{itemize}
CONCLUSION

The reality of Yalta was both an affirmation of regional power politics and self-interested goals, as a traditional diplomatic negotiation situation characterized by hard-bargaining and mutual concessions. Consequently, the Yalta conference could be described in terms of balance of power between the parties, even more when the scenario of the WWII were in constant changing, and the USSR was gaining territory in the military campaign against Germany. In addition, to better understand the complexity of the negotiating process in the Yalta conference negotiation is possible to describe various stages, as the moments of concessions, when there are adjustments of the argumentations and agreements.

It is important to remember the underlying interests of the Big Three. Their positions flowed from these interests; they guided the evolution of these positions and why they choose certain options. Plus, the Big Three’s underlying interests revealed how seemingly unrelated positions were actually linked. For instance, FDR’s reaction to the fears detailed above can be interpreted in multiple ways. However, if his underlying interest is ascertained, what the President and his subordinates were actually trying to address is uncovered.

On paper, each of the Big Three has won some victories and everyone has done Concessions. For Poland, for example, the border between Germany and Poland withdraw to the Neisse River, and of course, the Polish government would be dominated by the communist parties. Instead of these Concessions, Russians have made important statements about the need for democracy and free elections. Stalin has accepted one of the main proposals of the United States, concerning the formula to vote in the United Nations, in addition to accepting one of the aims of England, the recognition of France as a great European power. The American delegation admitted, as a basis for further discussions, the 10 billion of dollars that Germany should has paid to the USSR as war reparations.

Finally, Britain’s astute use of tactics to convince, cajole, or to induce others parties to adopt its positions (Britain’s control of the negotiation) created the context in which WWII postwar planning was determined. However, they were the weakest party and thus could not overcome, through force or leverage, the natural suspicions and distrust that their control over the process unleashed.

---

62 Ibid
BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. BOOKS


II. SENIOR THESIS

- GROSSBERG Mathew M., *Yalta, a Tripartite Negotiation to Form the Post-World Order: Planning for the conference, The Big Three´s Strategies*, a thesis Submitted for the Degree Master of Arts in the Department of History Indiana University, Indiana, United States, August 2015.

III. ACADEMICS ARTICLES

- CRUMP Larry and GLENDON A. Ian, *Toward a Paradigm of Multipolarity Negotiation* in International Negotiation, No. 3, Kluwer Law Intenational, Netherlands, pp. 197-234

- DEBYSER Félix, *Sur la Conférence de Yalta*, in Revue d’histoire de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, 10^e Année, No. 39, pp. 23-30


IV. OFFICIAL SOURCES


Appendix 1: Patterns of the Yalta Negotiations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DECISION</th>
<th>FEB. 5</th>
<th>FEB. 6</th>
<th>FEB. 7</th>
<th>FEB. 8</th>
<th>FEB. 9</th>
<th>FEB. 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>d</td>
<td>e</td>
<td>f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>d</td>
<td>e</td>
<td>f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a</td>
<td>b</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>d</td>
<td>e</td>
<td>f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S</td>
<td>SB</td>
<td>SB</td>
<td>SB</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**KEY:**
Placement from left to right signifies temporal sequence of statements. Placement from top to bottom signifies approximate distance between negotiating positions on a spectrum from unity (overlapping positions) . . . to diametrically opposed positions. The original position of the nation initiating the proposal is placed in the upper left hand corner; opposition negotiating stances can be contrasted by scanning the chart.

A = USA
B = GREAT BRITAIN
S = SOVIET UNION

[Graphical representation of the key and chart]


Appendix 2: Viladia Palace.