Is it a “Category Error” (Majone 2005) to claim that the European Union suffers from a Democratic Deficit?

Mélanie BARTOSIK

EU INSTITUTIONS, DECISION-MAKING AND POLICIES

Professor: Christopher LORD

Academic Assistant: Joanna ZIÓLKOWSKA

Academic Year 2016-2017

3485 WORDS
"If men were angels, no government would be necessary.
If angels were to govern men,
Neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.
In framing a government which is to be administrated by men over men,
The great difficulty lies in this:
You must first enable the government to control the governed;
And in the next place oblige it to control itself."

James Madison, *The Federalist Papers* 51, 1787-88
Contents

Introduction .................................................................................................................. 4

I) The myth of democratic deficit................................................................. 5

The democratic deficit as a Category Error: a Majone approach ... 5
The responsiveness argument: 'enlightened' bureaucracy .......... 6

II) The end of the myth: the reality .............................................................. 8

The lack of representatively and good perceptions ....................... 8
The Democracy, the victim of European Integration: a reality or realities?............................................................... 9

III) A constructive improvement of democracy inside the EU.. 10

Variables and strategies ................................................................................. 11
The role of the NP in the decision-making.............................................. 11

Conclusion: the democratic deficit: between myth and reality.... 12

Bibliography: ...................................................................................................... 14

Annexes..................................................................................................................... 17
Introduction

"A state has no worse enemy than an absolute king… Under such a ruler there is no common law. One man holds the whole law in his own gap; that poses an End to equality." ¹

The majority of Europeans citizens are attached to the democratic system. They do not conceive an alternative system of government in their country. The candidate to the accession of the EU must respect the fundamental principles of the European Union underlined by the article 49 of the Lisbon Treaty²: "Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union". The concept of democracy is essential to take part in the Union because every European citizen should be able to participate, on an equal basis, in the political decision-making.

The words demos (people) and kratein (to rule, to govern)³ shows Democracy is about people ruling themselves. However, definitions of democracy are generally vague, it is a "political ideal that animates a living society and develops there through interpretation and practice"⁴. The European Union is not an exception. The European Union is perceived as democratic, but the functioning of the democracy could divide. Besides, the very strong current mistrust of the public opinion towards the European Union and towards its institutions raises the question of their democratic legitimacy.

In 2005, Giandomenico Majone⁵ considered that claiming European Union is suffering from a democratic deficit is a "Category Mistakes"⁶. It is widely agreed that the EU ought to be democratic. However, as C. Lord points out⁷, the question is whether it can be democratic?

If: "Ought implies can"⁸, "asking whether the Union can be democratic may involve specifying how it can be made democratic"⁹.

---

¹ Euripides, Suppliant Women, Aris & Phillips, 2006, pp. 429-32
² Article 49 of the Lisbon Treaty.
⁴ Ibid, p.4
⁶ Ibid, Chapter 2, "Integration and democracy: the big trade-off" (notes: The reference was found on an electronic version, the number of pages was not included).
The research will be focused on the following question: The purpose of the following development is to show to what extent/ in what way the notion of democratic deficit is a myth.

First of all, it will be argued that democratic deficit is a category mistake, which consists "in discussing certain facts as if they belonged to one logical type or category when they actually belong to another"\textsuperscript{10}, and it can be applied, in this case\textsuperscript{11}, for the European Union (I). The following development will prove that this definition can apply to the European Union.

Secondly, it will be seen that the point of view defended by Majone and his arguments can paradoxically explain the sentiment of exclusion felt by EU citizens, especially in the decision-making process (II). Thirdly, the burning issue of whether or not the Union should be democratic will be addressed, and if so, in what way. (III).

I) The myth of democratic deficit

G. Majone and A. Moravcsik think that the EU does not suffer a "democratic deficit"\textsuperscript{12}. Majone will use the expression "a category error" to explain this phenomenon. The aim of this part is to understand why it is possible to argue that democratic deficit is a myth.

The democratic deficit as a Category Error: a Majone approach

The democratic deficit is for Majone, an apparent Paradox. Indeed, on the one hand, the Copenhagen criteria impose the respect by each Member State of certain principles. On the other hand, complaints of democratic deficit continue to grow. It seems paradoxical: "If the EU were a state it could not be a member of the Union"\textsuperscript{13}. However, Majone argues that it is not paradoxical but merely the consequence of the preference "of the European voters,"\textsuperscript{14} to avoid a European nation.

\textsuperscript{8} Emmanuel Kant, Critique of pure reason, Macmillan, London, 1781, p.637.
\textsuperscript{9} Christopher Lord, A different kind of democracy?, Op.Cit, p.1
\textsuperscript{10} Giandomenico Majone, Dilemmas of European Integration, Op. Cit., Chapter 2, "Integration and democracy: the big trade-off"
\textsuperscript{12} Giandomenico Majone, Dilemmas of European Integration, Op. Cit, Chapter 2.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
While the democratic deficit is viewed as the "lack of fit between the Union and the standard criteria of liberal democracy"\textsuperscript{15}, Chryssochoou\textsuperscript{16} insists on the fact that it is a term which "refers to the EU's non standard practices and institutions of decision making, and its inability to generate either a significant shift in loyalties towards itself or a deep sense of shared interests between the peoples of the Members states."\textsuperscript{17} Nevertheless, for Majone, it would appear that there is a category mistake. Indeed, this mistake is considering the EU as Member State. He underlines the irrelevance of this term and explains that the majority of experts talk about the Union as if it was "a state rather than an organization of corporate bodies". He reminds that, according to Rakove\textsuperscript{18} "the principle of legislation for states or governments in their corporate or collective capacities, and as contradistinguished from the individuals of which they consist"\textsuperscript{19}. Furthermore, Majone refutes the argument by analogy according to which national standards are used for the European Institutions. The consequences of this argument are that the European Parliament should have a stronger legislative power because National parliaments viewed its capacity evolved after the Lisbon Treaty. Then, one very concerning point could be the fact that, according to the derived standards of legitimacy\textsuperscript{20}, the veto power of the MS is "the single most legitimating element of European integration, since it excludes the possibility that the preferences expressed by a majority of voters in a members state may be overrun by decisions taken at European level."\textsuperscript{21} The problem is less the unfinished application of democratic principles and European integration, than the transition to majority voting, which "weakens national parliamentary control of the Council without increasing the power of PE"\textsuperscript{22}.

\textbf{The responsiveness argument: 'enlightened' bureaucracy}

Moravcsik is one of the most prominent scholars of EU integration. In his view: "Constitutional checks and balances, indirect democratic control via national governments, and the increasing powers of the European Parliament are sufficient to ensure that EU policy-

\textsuperscript{17} Alex Warleigh, Op. Cit., p.6.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid, p.28.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.
making is, in nearly all cases, clean, transparent, effective and politically responsive to the demands of European citizens.\textsuperscript{23}

Following Majone's argumentation, it could be argued that the EU is sentenced to be "a regulating institution\textsuperscript{24}, a political system endowed with instruments of regulation without big latitude in the fiscal domain. The weakness of their fiscal resources can hardly be considered as "tyrannical"\textsuperscript{25}.

Furthermore, in order to qualify the democratic deficit, Majone and Moravcsik extol the "virtues of 'enlightened' bureaucracy against the danger of untrammelled 'popular' democracy, or majoritarian rule in the current parlance.\textsuperscript{26} The technocrats in the Council, Commission and EU working groups or agencies are more dedicated to the citizens' protection than the European Parliament for Majone. On the contrary, Moravcsik doesn't believe in the technocratic rule, he is more optimistic concerning the fact that the design of the EU will guarantee the interests of the citizens.

To conclude this part, it is visible that the main argument of these two scholars in qualifying the democratic deficit is the delegated democracy argument according to which in order to be democratically controlled that to be democratically controlled the EU does not itself need to be a democracy. It is sufficient that it can be controlled via the democracies of its components states.

The democratic deficit is a myth: Majone considers that the EU is a regulatory state, which should not "seek to imitate the democratic processes of nation-states"\textsuperscript{27}. Following this idea, Weiler adds that it exists a lack of preconditions to "become a democratic polity: without a single demos, a single European political community, majoritarian democratic institutions are neither possible nor desirable"\textsuperscript{28}.

However, An additional element has to be underlined, which proved the existence of a democratic deficit in the EU. Andrea Follesdal and Simon Hix argue, "a democratic polity

\textsuperscript{23} A. Moravcsik, "In defence of the 'democratic deficit': Reassessing the legitimacy of the European Union", \textit{Journal of Common Market Studies}, Vol 40, No.4, pp.603-34 ici p.605.
\textsuperscript{24} Andrew Moravcsik, « Le mythe du déficit démocratique européen », \textit{Raisons politiques} 2003/2 (no 10), p. 87-105 ici p.91.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{26} Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, "Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU : a response to Majone and Moravcsik, \textit{JCMS}, volume 44, No 3., 2006, pp.533-62 ici p.546.
requires contestation for political leadership and over policy”. An observation of the decision-making process shows that it is conspicuously absent in the European Union.

II) The end of the myth: the reality

Despite the disagreement about democratic deficit in the EU, most critics and facts show that the EU has a problem with democracy. The nature and trajectory of the EU are essential to understand the phenomenon.

The lack of representatively and good perceptions

The supranational body of the EU doesn't take into account the citizen's opinions and that creates a gap between both the citizens and the ideas they defend. According to Reif and Schmitt, there is almost no link between voter preferences in EP elections and EP decision-making. The appendix shows that the feeling of European citizen about democracy is not good. More than 11 countries have less than 20% of citizens who agree with the fact their voice is heard in the EU. Furthermore, very often, more than half of the population of member countries argues that they are not satisfied with democracy in the EU. For instance, only 40% of the Austrian are satisfied with Democracy in the EU and more than 60 % in the Austrian nation. The same observation can be drawn from the turnout of the EP elections: in 2014, the turnout was 42.61 % only (42.97 % in 2009). It could be explained by the fact that European Parliament elections "are not about Europe, but are 'second-order national contests'". It is exactly the same issue with the proposal of

29 Ibid., p.533.
31 Claude Castro Quintas, "Democratic deficit in the EU: towards a participatory approach", RIPS, Volume 14, No 1, 2015, pp.63-82 i ci p.64.
33 Annexe 1: Eurobarometer autumn 2013.
34 Annexe 2: Satisfaction with democracy in the European Union (percentages) 2009.
referendum when people vote for a European issue because they vote about isolated issues and not for specific policy content.

The Democracy, the victim of European Integration: a reality or realities?

In the article "Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU"\(^{38}\), it is widely agreed that output democracy cannot work without input democracy. Indeed, citizen's preferences are reliably and linked by procedures, which guarantee public control. For instance, for Powell \(^{39}\) "competitive elections are crucial to make policies and elected officials responsive to the preferences of citizens"\(^{40}\).

It is possible to assist to an institutional battle about who represents the best for the EU citizen? Paul Ricoeur\(^{41}\) calls "le mal politique", the tendency of "those who exercise governmental power to identify themselves therewith and thus monopolise that power. In this way, It could be argued that EP tries to react to the lack of representativeness: in October 2004, a coalition in the EP refused to support the proposed lining-up for the new Commission: "despite heavy lobbying by many national government from both right and left for their MEPs to break from their European party positions"\(^{42}\). Alongside, an increase of contestation in the council of ministers is noticeable.

If it is possible to resume the fact that it exists a democratic deficit, there are very convincing points. As a matter of fact, there is an historical reality, a "boomerang effect"\(^{43}\) because of the construction of the EU and choices, which are decided. Moreover, it is possible to notice a political reality i.e a symptom of a lack of pedagogy. There is a gap between the evolution of the European institutions integration and national institutions. Then, a sociological reality because of a "une forme de procès en élitisme" developed by Olivier Costa\(^{44}\) which underlines the fact that the European Union is controlled by an elite.


\(^{38}\) Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, Op. Cit.


\(^{40}\) Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, Op. Cit., p.561.


\(^{42}\) Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, Op. Cit., p.553.

\(^{43}\) Pierre Verluise, "UE: Pourquoi un tel déficit démocratique ?", IRIS, 7 mai 2009

\(^{44}\) Olivier Costa, Paul Magnette, Une Europe des Elites ? Réflexions sur la fracture démocratique de l’Union
However, the most problematic issue of the European Union is maybe the media reality, which supposes a deficit of visibility. De facto, some critics can be drawn from the absence of real media interest for institutions and politics of the European Union.

To conclude this part, one concerning point is the increase of proposals to change the European decision-making process. For instance, Hix proposed a direct election of the Commission President by a qualified majority vote after the Nice treaty. The question was: Should the European Union be democratic? And then how should it be democratic? The European Union is supposed to be democratic because a European polity requires democracy. Then, this improvement needs to be constructive and can't represent a blockade in the decision-making process. However, for Monnet, "I thought it wrong to consult the peoples of Europe about the structure of a community of which they had no practical experience." That is why, it is important to take into consideration the balance of opinions and adapt to different variables and adopt different strategies.

III) A constructive improvement of democracy inside the EU

There is a large amount of solutions that we could propose. The aim of this part is to focus on one or two solutions to reduce the democratic deficit and critically evaluate it. There is a difference between democratic Europe, which takes into account all the points of view at the risk of not being able to anymore decide or of deciding too late; and more technocratic, more monolithic Europe, which reduces the circuits of decisions, sets the risk of overriding of possible vetos, to act faster and effectively.

---

Variables and strategies

It is alleged that EU democratic performance will vary according to different elements. For instance, it could wear different attributes or taking different forms of models or Union institutions. Furthermore, the democratic qualities of the rule in the EU depend on the Member States. That is why it is possible to distinguish categories of reforms and their strategies. In the article of Alex Warleigh, in 2003\textsuperscript{48}, he decided to underline reform strategies though four main categories. The first category is the reconfiguration of national sovereignty through the reconfiguration of principles of "subsidiarity" and "flexibility".\textsuperscript{49} The second category is the "institutional change with the empowerment of the EP".\textsuperscript{50} The third category is the change in the scope and powers of the Union which is: "enhanced capacities in cohesion and social policies, the creation of the second and third pillars of the Union, dedicated respectively to the common foreign and security policy and police and judicial cooperation"\textsuperscript{51}. Last but not least, the fourth category is the "attempted creation of a European demos by such mechanisms as EU citizenship and quasi corporatist Union Policy-making"\textsuperscript{52}

The role of the NP in the decision-making

The EU suffers from a "lack of democratic accountability and legitimacy; moreover they seem inaccessible to ordinary citizens because their operating method is very complex, opaque and remote".\textsuperscript{53} National Parliaments were the victims of deparlimentarisation. When the EU consisted of reduced members, 6 to 12 members, National P were considered as a periphery to the development of the European integration and their traditional sense of democracy was ignored. The Lisbon Treaty gave the possibility that national parliaments carry out

\textsuperscript{48} Alex Warleigh, Op. Cit.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., p.1
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., p.1
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., p.1
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., p.2
\textsuperscript{53} Marta Zalewska and Oskar Josef Gstrein, "National Parliaments and their role in European Integration: the EU’s democratic deficit in times of economic hardship and political insecurity", Bruges Political Research Papers / Cahiers de recherche politique de Bruges, No 28 / February 2013
subsidiarity checks on policy proposals. Except the Yellow and orange card set up since this Treaty, there are lots of proposals to increase the involvement of NP in the decision making process. Taken together, this can give the impression to the citizen he can be taken seriously. Indeed, in the context of Brexit, David Cameron proposed a red card for NP, which could allow for a veto.\(^{54}\)

Within the framework of a interview, Claudia Heffler\(^ {55}\) qualified the efficiency of the red card. According to her, the red card is part of the debate with Brexit but doesn't have any future. She underlines the fact that a veto could block the proceedings and because of the democratic deficit, it is necessary to be strategic: indeed, people shouldn't encourage blockade: "the European making possess must be constructive"\(^ {56}\). This is the reason why she proposed another idea, a green card, which would allow NP to bring proposals

### Conclusion: the democratic deficit: between myth and reality

The general perception is that in the European Union, there is a credibility crisis. Many scholars, like Majone, prefer to separate this crisis and the democratic deficit. Others tend to say that credibility crisis is the consequence of the democratic deficit. The legitimacy of the decision-making structure has long been subject to debate.

Europe is an object sui generis, which cannot be categorize in the classic constitutional types. In the parliamentary system, it borrows the responsibility of the Commission front of the Parliament. In the presidential system, it owes its functioning to the collaboration of powers which can exist without management of common policy. The famous "community method" is the synthesis.\(^ {57}\) This is the reason why it could be argued that the democratic deficit is a way to hide a lack of thought on the constitutional nature of the EU.

---

\(^{54}\) Sarah Hagemann, Chris Hanretty and Simon Hix, "Introducing Cameron's EU red card will have limited impact", *The guardians*, 10 February 2016.  
(consulted on 05/11/2016)

\(^ {55}\) Interview with Professor Claudia Heffler within the framework of the course of Prof. Kaddous : EU legal order, 28/10/2016, Notes :Claudia Heffler brought an interesting point of view about democratic deficit.

\(^ {56}\) Ibid.

\(^ {57}\) Bruno Alomar, "L'injuste déficit démocratique européen", *Libération*, 30 janvier 2014,  
http://www.liberation.fr/planete/2014/01/30/l-injuste-deficit-democratique-europeen_976664
This deficit seems to be inevitable. Despite the application of the principle of subsidiarity, the framework of representative democracies raises a significant obstacle between citizens and the political sphere.

In the view of this research, we might consider that the democratic deficit is the slightest evil of what we know as modern democracies, in which the ideal of direct democracy has long been abandoned.
Bibliography:

Books:


- KANT Emmanuel, *Critique of pure reason*, Macmillan, London, 1781,


**Scientific articles and publications:**

- CASTRO QUINTAS Claude, "Democratic deficit in the EU: towards a participatory approach", *RIPS*, Volume 14, No 1, 2015, pp.63-82

- FOLLESDAL Andreas and HIX Simon, "Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU: a response to Majone and Moravcsik, *JCMS*, volume 44, No 3., 2006, pp.533-62


- MORAVCSIK Andrew, "In defence of the 'democratic deficit': Reassessing the legitimacy of the European Union", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol 40, No.4, pp.603-34

- MORAVCSIK Andrew, « Le mythe du déficit démocratique européen », *Raisons politiques* 2003/2 (no 10), p. 87-105


- VERLUISE Pierre,"UE: Pourquoi un tel déficit démocratique ?", *IRIS*, 7 mai 2009


- ZALEWSKA Marta and GSTREIN Oskar Josef, "National Parliaments and their role in European Integration: the EU's democratic deficit in times of economic hardship and political insecurity", *Bruges Political Research Papers / Cahiers de recherche politique de Bruges*, No. 28 / February 2013
Websites:


Press articles:


- HAGEMANN Sarah, HANRETTY Chris and HIX Simon, "Introducing Cameron's EU red card will have limited impact", The Guardians, 10 February 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/datablog/2016/feb/10/introducing-camerons-eu-red-card-limited-impact
Annexes

Annexe 1: Eurobarometer autumn 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Not satisfied</th>
<th>How democracy works</th>
<th>Perception of economy</th>
<th>My voice counts</th>
<th>Are you a citizen?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-28</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Data for each category is broken down into different percentage ranges.*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU</th>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: EES (2009).*

*Note:* Based on responses to the question: ‘How satisfied are you, on the whole, with the way democracy works in your country/the European Union?’ Percentage of respondents who are fairly or very satisfied with democracy.