The Potsdam Conference

A Track one diplomacy case study: the ability to use political power to influence the direction of negotiations and their outcomes

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«I do not hold that we should rearm in order to fight. I hold that we should rearm in order to parley.»

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Introduction

During the Second World War, the World was divided into two alliances. The Allies consisted of France, Poland, and Great Britain, who were later joined by the USSR in 1941. On the other hand, there were the Axis powers including Germany, Italy and Japan. During the War, many countries were occupied and the United States, United Kingdom and Soviet Union decided to control Allied policy. That’s why they were called the “Big three”\(^1\). Their interests coincided and an agreement was signed on July 1941. During the war, the Big three “kept in contact by means of telegrams and embassies”\(^2\). They agreed to have a meeting in Tehran in November 1943. Stalin expected that others had to take risks to meet him. Egocentrically, he decided to stay not far from USSR with a very secure embassy in the Iranian capital. The next conference took place in Yalta in February 1945. The famous photograph was showing Churchill smoking his cigar, Roosevelt haggard and Stalin “composed, with folded hands”\(^3\). They found an agreement on several points: for instance, the priority of the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany (that would be divided in four different zones). Then, it is necessary to notice Stalin’s acceptance concerning the fourth occupation zone by France. The question of Germany’s reparations needed to be in the form of forced labour with the creation of a reparation council. Finally, Yalta agreed about the status of Poland with the recognition of the communist Provisional government of the Republic of Poland installed by the USSR “on a broader democratic basis”\(^4\).

There were other key points but it is not necessary to develop them at this moment because the analysis will explain later the importance of the impact of the Yalta conference in a chronological continuation logic. Yalta stayed in popular minds because this conference is associated with the conclusion of the armed conflict in Europe. Furthermore, it seems to keep values and honour. At the end of the Yalta conference, an article of the Time magazine\(^5\) wrote: “Si l’on pouvait douter que les trois grands seraient capables de coopérer dans la paix autant que pendant la guerre, on a aujourd’hui l’impression que tous ces doutes ont été balayés.”\(^6\) However, it was not the case for the Potsdam conference, which took place from July 17\(^{th}\) till August 2\(^{nd}\), 1945. Harry Truman, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin met to reconstruct the World. They met despite divergent interests, opposite ambitions, faiths and different political systems. This study will analyse the exchanges which followed the conferences of Tehran in November, 1943 and Yalta in February, 1945. The doubts which seemed exceeded during these negotiations will reappear in Potsdam and will lead slowly towards the beginnings of the Cold war.

The question is: What elements played a role through the Potsdam Conference and made the agreements signed by “the Big three” as they are well-known today? This analysis will follow a chronological order because it is better to explain as one goes along the different and various elements of the conference. Actually, the method, which consists to see the different approaches point by point, is not applicable to this case. The main approach which should be used is the "Behavioral approach". First of all, the Potsdam conference supposed talks between three of the most influential men at the time. The personality of the

\(^2\) Ibid. p.460.
\(^3\) Plate 7, reproduced after in Foreign relations of the United States, 1945, Diplomatic papers: the conferences at Malta and Yalta- hereafter referred to as Yalta Papers, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1956, p.546
\(^5\) Time Magazine, February 19th, 1945.
leaders who are going to influence the process of negotiation is a very important issue. De Gaulle said: “À part quelques principes essentiels, il n’y a pas de système universel, mais seulement des circonstances et des personnalités”. The case will show different interactions: According to Kelman, negotiations are crucial before the beginning of the negotiation process by helping the negotiators to decide to sit down at the negotiation table. It is the pre negotiation phase. Then, when the negotiations began the informal exchanges between the parties, already trusting each other or not, move on to the problem-solving phase. Finally, these meetings turn out and are useful after an agreement (post negotiation phase) because it allows favouring a real transformation of parties’ relationships. The decision process study of the Potsdam conference is the way to talk about different approaches in international relations.

First of all, it is necessary to talk about the preliminary rounds of the Potsdam conference. It is the way to introduce the initiation phase which consists of observing the context of the conference, the goal through a structural and a strategic approach, the protagonists through a behavioral study and a processual approach thanks to very important preparation phases (exchanges of letters, correspondence) (I). Then, it will be relevant to see how were two weeks of the summer 1945 changed the History. The analysis will consider the agenda, sensitive subjects through different approaches such as strategy: indeed, it will be interesting to explore the information gathering phase, the focal point and the turning point, the prisoner’s dilemma..., the role of Ministers of Foreign Affairs (II). At last, the conclusion will be focused on a key element, meaning the final agreement, which took place within the last days of the conference.

I) The preliminary round of the Potsdam Conference, the initiation phase

A) A Post Yalta context: the crumbling of the agreement

In the Yalta context, Diane S. Clemens wrote a study of the three statesmen who were able to achieve to compromise. The Big Three “prized agreement by traditional negotiation as preferable to unilateral action which might undermine international stability “. Clemens was arguing against the standard conservative interpretation that Stalin had prevailed against a naive Roosevelt and a helpless Churchill. At the same time, the conference as a constructive negotiation was later undone by Truman’s determination to break « those agreements at Yalta which reflected soviet intentions ». This analysis demonstrates it is impossible to understand Potsdam without Yalta. To begin the study, the most interesting thing to do is to establish the Object, Context, Element at stake, Asymmetry of power and the Negotiators. (OCEAN). It is clear that the Potsdam conference was aimed at pursuing the agreements of Yalta and at deciding on the way of administering certain points.

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11 Ibid., p.288.
12 Ibid., pp267-291.
To continue this study, a structural approach\textsuperscript{13} can explain some events that happened between Yalta and Potsdam. The negotiation is often analysed as a bargaining situation putting at stake many demonstrations of power. It is necessary to gain or sustain one’s own advantage in the upcoming negotiation. That’s why many countries employ tactics designed to create power equalization as a way to level the playing field. “The tactics may be designed to enhance the negotiator’s own power or to diminish the other’s power, and to create a state of either power equalization or power difference”.\textsuperscript{14} In a long-term relationship, you have elements of both trust and distrust. All relationships can be highly ambivalent, or not so much. In some circumstances, it is possible to feel a kind of distrust: The reputation of the actor will play a role, as the context will do as well.

“Trust is an individual’s belief in and willingness to act on the words, actions and decisions of another”\textsuperscript{15}, according to Mc Allister in 1995. In this case, the problem is the relationship between Stalin and Churchill. Indeed, as if it had never taken place, the events of spring 1945 were going to create a very tense atmosphere: optimism is not there anymore, and the differences are felt in particular on the Rumanian and Polish question.\textsuperscript{16} Furthermore, the Berne Incident worsened this situation. \textsuperscript{17} At this moment, this case reflected the notion of “identification-based distrust”\textsuperscript{18} developed by Lewicki and Wiethoff. Defined as “confident negative expectations regarding another’s conduct, grounded in perceived incompatibility of values…”\textsuperscript{19} Churchill had a background concerning relations with Stalin; he lived in Europe and felt fears regarding the borders. Distrust is quite perceptible.

Confronted to the Soviet transgression, and apparent provocation, the United States of America (USA) and Great Britain diverged in their ideas about how to deal with the Soviet government.\textsuperscript{20} Churchill urged the armies of the Western front to secure positions “as far into the center of Europe as possible, and along as many enclosing edges of Europe as possible”.\textsuperscript{21} Americans were calmer. They considered it was better to show patience and friendliness. On March 11\textsuperscript{th}, 1945 Roosevelt was forced to admit Churchill was right and their correspondence strengthened: “il est manifeste que les Russes ont installé en Roumanie un gouvernement minoritaire de leur seul choix, mais, même si l’on ne tient pas compte des raisons reprises dans votre message, la Roumanie n’est pas un bon cas test”\textsuperscript{22}. At this moment of the pre negotiation, the case showed that Roosevelt tried to adopt a measured position. In a strategic perspective, the US decided to adopt an “Opening Stance”\textsuperscript{23}. The negotiator needs to think about the message he wishes to give. Roosevelt knew that the future negotiation was essential and that he preferred to be lenient concerning Soviet action. “There is a tendency for negotiators to respond “in kind” to

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p.198
\textsuperscript{15} MC ALLISTER D.J., « Affect and cognition-based trust as foundations for interpersonal cooperation in organizations », Academy of management journal, 38, p.25.
\textsuperscript{17} Berne incident: the negotiations in March 1945 between OAS Station Chief Allen Dulles and German Command for Northern Italy Karl Wolff increased the anxiety of Joseph Stalin about the United States and Britain were negotiating a separate peace with Nazi Germany against the interest of the Soviet Union.
\textsuperscript{20} FEIS Herbert, Between war and peace, the Potsdam conference, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960, pp.73-78.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p.73
\textsuperscript{22} LOEWENHEIM Francis L., LANGLEY Harold D. and JONES Manfred, Roosevelt and Churchill: their secret Wartime correspondence, New York: Dunton, 1975, pp.661-668.
distributive tactics in negotiation. Churchill’s reaction was understandable, because of the proximity with the USSR. As explained in the introduction, there exists a negotiations context. Is it always necessary to negotiate? Can we negotiate everything? Can we negotiate with whomever? The answer is linked to the conditions, which affect this choice and linked to the degree of trust between parties. Actually, after two very good negotiations in Tehran and Yalta, the leaders had an objective: to continue on the same path. A very singular event will happen at the beginning of spring 1945: President Roosevelt’s death. Truman became President of the United States in April 22nd, 1945. It was a very strong challenge to learn everything about this issue. A question settled in April, 1945: As the problems and the tensions are intensifying every day, should we not try a last effort to solve them, and gather a new conference of the “Big Three”? The first question is the object of the negotiation: Pierre Dabezies claims that "la décadence commence quand, ne sachant plus ce qui est légitime, on est prêt en fait, à tout négocier". The answer came rapidly. In a letter sent by Churchill to President Truman in London, 6 May 1945 an extract of the official message wrote: “It seems to me that matters can hardly be carried further by correspondence and that, as soon as possible, there should be a meeting of the three heads of government. (…) Thereafter, I feel that we must most earnestly consider our attitude towards the Soviets and show them how much we have to offer or withhold.” Churchill and Truman decided to opt for a “Tit-for-tat” approach. For them, it was better to « start with a cooperative choice, and thereafter does what the other player did on the previous move ».

Five days later, on May 11th, he sent another letter, which was more alarming: “3. An Iron curtain is drawn down upon their front. We do not know what is going on behind. (…) Surely it is vital now to come to an understanding with Russia or see where we are with her, before we weaken our armies mortally or retire to the zones of occupation. This can only be done by a personal meeting. To sum up, this issue of a settlement with Russia before our strength has gone seems to me to dwarf all others.” This exchange showed the degree of distrust between the different leaders. It was sure they wanted to prepare a strategy for the conference. According to a “processual” approach, as it was said before, the preparation phase was very important for this conference. Indeed, there were different interests, different personalities. Therefore, this analysis is going to study the preparation.

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29 Ibid. p.4 , chapter 1 genesis of the Conference : « initial correspondance concerning a tripartite conference »
B) A track one diplomacy: A meticulous preparation

The Official diplomacy: track one diplomacy

Official diplomacy is “an instrument of foreign policy for the establishment and development of contacts between the governments of different states through the use of intermediaries mutually recognized by the respective parties” 33. The most important feature that distinguishes “Track One diplomacy” 34 is the state-to-state level. It follows a certain protocol to which every state is a signatory. Track One Diplomacy is usually considered to be the primary peace-making tool of a state’s foreign policy. There are diplomats, high-ranking government officials, and heads of states and is aimed at influencing the structures of political power.

The study will use the United States government archives 35 (in the Library of Louvain-la-Neuve). All official documents such as letters and correspondences are attached at the end of this work. 36 Actually, the correspondences of the “big Three” and their own correspondences show the genesis of the conference. This part of the work will focus on the conference preparation according to a “processual approach” 37. Holmes states that “Phase models provide a narrative explanation of negotiation process; that is, they identify sequences of events that constitute the story of a negotiation. (...) A phase serves a set of related functions in the movement from initiation to resolution of a dispute” 38. A table shows perfectly the different phases. 39 As the title of the work shows, the initiation phase was very important for the Potsdam conference. We will see two phases of this approach. The first is the preparation: this is the diagnosis of the problem, it will determine what is important, the goal…. The diagnosis is based on a team-by-team process and this is the moment to clarify the expectations but also, to understand the other party’s expectations. The second phase is the relationship building: Parties need to depersonalize the definition of the problem, to be at ease in terms of human relations and have cultural empathy through a “cultural approach” as argued Greenhalgh. 40

The preparation phase represents approximately 85%- 90% of the work. At this moment exists the possibility to convince the other. During the correspondence between the “big three” and the important role of the Ambassador in these countries, it is useful to underline the positions taken during the preliminaries. The first thing is the choice of the date for the meeting. Truman sent Harry Hopkins 41 in Moscow and showed he wanted to follow Roosevelt’s attitude towards the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR): “Je laissais à Harry la liberté la plus totale : du langage diplomatique traditionnel à la batte de baseball, qu’il utilise tous les moyens qui lui paraîtraient susceptibles de convaincre M.Staline”. 42 During his first meeting

36 Annex 1, Ibid., p.25.
39 Annex 2: Figure 4.2 and 4.3, LEWICKI Roy J., BARRY Bruce, SAUNDERS David M., Op Cit., p.117.
41 Hopkins was the top American official assigned to dealing with Soviet officials during World War II. He interfaced with Soviet officials ranging from the middle ranks to the very highest, including Stalin
with Stalin, Hopkins asked a place where Stalin would like to go to the conference: “Stalin remarked that he recalled the toast at the Crimea Conference to their next meeting in Berlin”. No record of this toast has ever been found but maybe it was a strategy to propose a closed place. In a strategic approach, it could be seen as the initial offer. At the same time, he was flexible because Stalin adopted an opening stance and proposed an opening offer about the date of the conference.

For Olekalns, Smith and Walsh, there are many reasons to have a flexible position. Firmness can have consequences such as the intransigence of the other party. After the proposal of the July 15th, Stalin wrote to Truman on May 30th: “Mr. Hopkins has transmitted me today your proposal regarding the meeting of the three. I have no objections against the proposed by you date_ July 15th”.

The role of the Ambassadors: preparation phase

Hopkins stayed in Moscow until June 7th, 1945 and met Stalin six times. In view of his positive attitude, Hopkins asked Stalin to list the Soviet worries and conditions and he obtained the following list: “1) l'admission de l'Argentine aux Nations unies; 2) a proposition américaine de faire siéger la France la Commission des Réparations; 3) la Pologne; 4) la fin du Prêt-Bail ; 5) la répartition entre les vainqueurs des marines militaire et marchande de l'Allemagne ». Hopkins is ready to discuss about the understanding of Americans for all questions except for the questions of Argentina and Poland. At this moment they already had the possibility to listen the interest of each other’s and prepared a strategy. For German ships, Hopkins gave the ideas to distribute the captured vessels equally between the Big three. Concerning the Polish question, it was more difficult. Stalin had the same argument: the safety of the USSR absolutely requires that Poland maintains a friendly government: the Memorandum of the 2nd conversation at the Kremlin showed that: “He said all the Soviet Union wanted was that Poland should not be in a position to open the gates to Germany and in order to prevent this Poland must be strong and democratic.”

During the conversations between Hopkins and Stalin, it became very clear that the main problem was the Polish question: On June 1st, during dinner, Hopkins decided to be transparent and gave information: “He must believe me when I told him that our whole relationship was threatened by the impasse of Poland. I made it clear again to Stalin that Poland was only a symbol, that the United States had equal interests in all countries in this part of the world and that if we were going to act or maintain our interests on a tripartite basis, it was hopeless to do so without a strong American public opinion.” This conversation showed the importance of informal sessions. It brought a possibility to exchange information and opinions in a lighter way. Simultaneously to the Hopkins effort in Moscow, Joseph Davies began his mission in London. His mission had a key objective: inform Churchill, as diplomatically as possible, that Truman wanted to discuss with Stalin alone. He tried to convince the British that it was intended to avoid giving the impression that Western Allies “ganging up” on them.

43 Foreign Relations of the United States: diplomatic papers, The Conference of Berlin (Potsdam Conference)1945, Op cit., p.25: « Memorandum by the assistant to the Secretary of State (Bohlen), May 26th, 1945 (Annexe 1)
The Truman administration “turned a colder shoulder to the British, rushing ahead of the embarrassed Foreign Office in recognizing the only lightly modified Polish government and publishing accelerated schedules of anticipated troops withdrawals from Europe. Churchill was able to dissuade Truman from his wish to meet alone with Stalin before the Potsdam conference. But Anglo-American relations were now cooler at every level.”

Churchill considered this attitude as a personal affront, but also as a raw manifestation of the fact that Great Britain didn’t anymore have the capacity to take independent positions in World affairs.

If the analyse followed the OCEAN logic, the question of Asymmetry of power may be asked. Indeed, at the beginning of the negotiation, USSR was the outsider but after the preliminary phase, the study noticed that London and Churchill were put aside. F. Pfetsch, in *Power in international Negotiations: symmetry and asymmetry*, defined the Asymmetry as: “a structure one can find among most social and political relations and in relations between unequal parties. Asymmetry is a relationship between the small and the great, the weak and the strong”.

He aimed to explain how the underlying power relations could change in form during the negotiation process: “Whereas at the start of international negotiations, symmetry/asymmetry relates to the national potential each negotiating partner can count upon; during the negotiations symmetry/asymmetry is transformed into a process variable depending on the adequate means employed.”

The most important element to take into account during these negotiations was the personalities, which went to Potsdam. This paper analyses their role, the context, their background. Furthermore, it is important to describe the relationships between the members of U.S, British and Soviet delegations.

**C) “The big three”: a world of strong personalities**

The analysis will focus on a behavioural approach and a cultural approach. Actually, the Potsdam conference saw many personalities with a strong charisma. Three Heads of states and three ministers of foreign affairs were the main negotiators during this case and played a very important role. The analysis will be focused on behaviour to understand how they managed their feelings, to see what were the ways of negotiating they preferred. If their respective background is taken into account as the State they had to lead, a cultural approach was necessary for them to make concessions and to understand each other’s. These approaches are essential to understand the elements which conducted to the Potsdam agreement. The delegations’ composition was substantially the same as Yalta for Britain and Soviet: on one side, Stalin, Molotov and Vyshinsky and on the other side Churchill, Eden, Cadogan. Clement Atlee, leader of the British Labour Party was in Potsdam with an observer role. The US delegation had some new faces such as Byrnes and Truman. Following the idea of Deutsch, each person has different psychological orientations according to social situations: it is the Personal orientation.

**1) Stalin / Molotov, The tyrant and his double**

*Marshall Stalin, the red Czar*

Stalin held power the longest and his reputation was to be a clever and tough man. As Arthur Funk explained: “Pour avoir survécu aux luttes de pouvoir à l’intérieur des Soviets dans les années 20, pour avoir

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51 Ibid., p.39.

52 Annexe 4 photo 2

gardé ce pouvoir au temps des famines et des troubles paysans du début des années 30, et puis pour l'avoir assis définitivement au moyen des grandes purges de l'avant-guerre, il faut certes posséder une personnalité d'une force peu courante: indomptable, sans scrupules, cruel et intelligent, tel est sans doute Staline.”  

According to the cultural approach, compared to his colleagues Stalin was absolutely different. He was raised in the Georgian countryside and he was tough. Following the Lenin’s death in 1924, all were totally surprised when Stalin won the title of the Party’s leader. Stalin had many personality traits that affected how individuals use power: after the analysis of the Stalin’s cognitive orientation, it is easy to conclude he was characterized by a radical frame which means he believed that “society is in a continual clash of social, political and class interests, and that power is inherently and structurally imbalanced.” Furthermore, it is possible to attribute him a psychological disability, which is the Paranoia. His paranoia was very well known. This was what caused his death. Kramer explains, “Paranoia is a psychological disability in which the individual believes that he is the target of destructive actions by another person.” For the conference, Stalin chose the place of Berlin because he didn’t want to move a lot, he was very afraid for his security, even if it was a strategy to show his determination to lead the debate. Stalin knew he needed to go to Potsdam to sign a real agreement. His education determined his decision process and during his all life he adopted a hard line to negotiate. He probably knew he was aware of the risk, which he had taken by choosing this way. Indeed, Stalin has undergone the “toughness dilemma”.

“"The tougher the negotiator, the greater the chance of getting a favourable agreement but the less the chance of getting an agreement at all". On the contrary, “the weaker the negotiator, the greater the chance of getting an agreement, the less the chance of getting a favourable one.” According to his ideology, Stalin adopted deduction reasoning. In the process of deduction, it was necessary to begin with some statements, called 'premises', that are assumed to be true, then it determined what else would have to be true if the premises were verified. USSR always considered itself as a landlocked country, it always felt threatened and surrounded as known as "the Anaconda strategy". The will to have a "Great USSR" thanks to the Communism doctrine was a priority which had the consequence to give to Stalin a way to deliver his messages.

*Molotov, the "accountant of the Big Terror"*

Viatcheslav Mikhaïlovitch Scriabine, says "Molotov" ("hammer" in Russian), was Stalin's right arm for diverse posts: alternately editor-in-chief of "La Pravda", member of the Politburo, the leader of the Comintern Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1939... It was one of the rare people who reached directly the office of the dictator at the Kremlin. Leading player of the politics of terror and Stalin's repression, was nicknamed the "accountant of the Big Terror" for his role in the Trials of Moscow and the Big Purges (1937-

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56 LEWICKI Roy J., BARRY Bruce, SAUNDERS David M. Op Cit., p.206.  
58 FEIS Herbert, Op Cit., p.140.  
61 Ibid.  
Concerning Molotov, he was known as a tough negotiator and a determined defender of Soviet interests. It is necessary to underline the malaise of American diplomats vis-à-vis Molotov. Harriman, American ambassador in Moscow, said for example that he had the impression that Molotov's words to Stalin were not always honest. He was especially described as being not always comprehensive and suspected of being "encore beaucoup plus méfiant à notre égard" that Stalin himself. Similarly, in a personal memorandum of Truman written in 1954: "Nous avions tous l’impression que Molly (Molotov) ne rapportait à Staline les faits exacts que lorsqu’il y était absolument contraint. Personnellement, je l’ai toujours considéré comme l’exemple achevé d’une parfaite tête de lard." 63

2) Churchill/Eden: who’s leading?

Churchill, the Black dog

At the end of the war, Churchill had dissolved his ministry and decided that new general elections were going to take place in Great Britain. On June 30th, he pronounced his last electoral speech and went to paint in the French countryside. The election results would be known only later, in the middle of the Potsdam Conference, because it would take a long time to collect the votes of the English soldiers, distributed on a worldwide scale. That is why, Churchill declared: "Jusqu’à la fin des élections, je ne serai que la moitié de moi-même, et je me tiendrai à l’arrière-plan de la conférence." 64 Throughout his life, Churchill experienced a depressive tendency, which alternated periods of depression (he called it the “black dog”) with moments of euphoria daemon that required being dominated an effort by all moments. 65 During the negotiation, Churchill had a soft liner style due to his concern for the results of the elections.

Eden, the smart councillor

“A talk with Alec Cadogan about a meeting of the three great men. I am much worried that the whole business will be chaotic and nothing worth while settled, Stalin being the only one of the three who has a clear view of what he wants and is a tough negotiator. P. M’s all emotion in these matters, F.D.R vague and jealous of other” Anthony Eden diary, January 4th, 1945

At the beginning of his career, Eden was known as a "Man of Peace", and a skilled diplomat. Eden's second time as Foreign Secretary ended, as a result of electoral defeat, while Churchill and himself were representing Britain at the above-noted Potsdam conference in July 1945. He was aware of the Russian’s attitude and was one of the first to understand the risk to wait a meeting after Yalta.: “I am deeply concerned at the pattern of Russian policy, which becomes clearer as they become more brazen everyday”. 66 During the conference, he received the confirmation of his son's death, in an aeroplane over Burma. “A measure of lassitude, as well as melancholy, affected Eden at this conference. The diplomat William Hayter complained that he had succumbed to Churchill's vice of not reading briefs or otherwise seeking advice.” 67 Despite the picturesque illustrations of the lifestyle of the Soviet, they were too familiar by now to be amusing. He saw once again Churchill filled with admiration for Stalin. A good thing during the negotiation was the Anglo-Americans relationships, which have been better than he would have imagined.

64 MEE Charles L., Op Cit., p.42.
3) Truman/ Byrnes, a hidden rivalry?

Truman, “Give'em Hell Harry”

The New York Times eulogized Truman as “decisive President”68. According to it, Truman did not break under the strain, nor did he push his problems aside: he faced with determination. In 1956, the Congress accused the Truman's government of corruption: «never there been so much corruption practiced by so many public officials in so many different places »69. There was no proof of its own implication but it was a major defect in its capacity of leadership. However, during this scandal, Truman always defended his government, which proved his inflexibility and his sense of the loyalty. During the Potsdam conference, he had a hard liner strategy as Stalin. That’s why they led the negotiations to the great displeasure of the Great Britain. Truman used the new weapon against Japan less to hasten the end of the Second World War than to show his force to Stalin and to give to the U.S a dominant position in the world. Moreover, the use of such a weapon as also direct toward USSR, in order to do a demonstration of force. He thus broke with the policy of Roosevelt, taking an offensive posture power, developing an atomic diplomacy70 against the Soviets, losing their confidence and throwing the escalation of distrust, which led to the break of 1947.

Furthermore, while the Big Three discussed in Berlin, General Groves, director of "Manhattan project wrote his report to Washington Atomic Explosion experience that occurred in Alamogordo. The Secretary of War Stimson received this report on 21st of July71. Stimson’s diary explained the reaction of Truman (his behaviour): “the President was tremendously peppe up by it when I saw him. He said it gave him an entirely new feeling of confidence and he thanked me for having come to the conference”72 and Churchill added: “He told the Russians just where they got and off and generally bossed the whole meeting”.73 Within Allied relations, the atomic weapon discovery was the main stake. It would be normal to inform Stalin of the existence of the new weapon. But when, how, in what terms and to what extent? Discussions with the Russians about Japan required extreme caution, because of mutual mistrust prevailing between the future allies. During a negotiation, greater information sharing enhances effectiveness in achieving a good negotiation outcome. It was a way to improve the quality of trust between parties and Truman knew it was the best solution to say the truth to Stalin.74 Only a few days later, Truman announced the new to Stalin, at the end of a particularly stormy plenary about Poland. President will recount the interview in his Memoirs: "Le 24 juillet, j’annonçai négligemment à Staline que nous étions en possession d’une arme nouvelle ; d’une puissance de destruction sans pareille. Il ne manifesta aucun intérêt particulier ; tout ce qu’il dit, c’est qu’il « était content d’apprendre cette bonne nouvelle et qu’il espérait que nous en férions bon usage au Japon. »75

69 ABELS Jules, the Truman scandals, Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1956, p.312.
Byrnes, the second in command

James Byrnes was one of the most powerful men in American domestic and foreign policy in the mid-1940s. Historian George E. Mowry called Byrnes, "the most influential southern member of Congress between John Calhoun and Lyndon Johnson."76 At the beginning, the relationship between Truman and Byrnes was very good. He was the first person that Truman saw the first day of his presidency. He helped him and shared information about atomic bomb because the new President knew nothing about the Manhattan project beforehand. 77 Concerning foreign policy, Byrnes made decisions with the opinions of a few advisors such as Donald S. Russell and Benjamin V. Cohen. 78 He paid a little attention to the State Department staff. This way to council achieved to take “close” decision 79 where the Authority closed the access to interested people and to those who were not part of the official team. Byrnes had a weak constitution, but had also the good qualities of a negotiator, like intelligence, self-confidence and ambition. He was able to exercise its authority in so many areas that it has earned the nickname “Président en second”. As a consequence, so much consideration was given to him. In 1944, he was a candidate for the Vice-Presidency, but Roosevelt preferred Harry Truman. Although they have been rivals for a moment, Truman had the highest respect for the intelligence and experience of Byrnes80. Desirous to be known, he took sometimes supplementary initiatives, beyond Roosevelt's instructions. His manners were sometimes judged as being condescending. Truman wrote in 1957 in his Memoirs : « A cette époque, moi je lui faisais implicitement la plus entière confiance et lui, il complotait déjà pour diriger le pays par-dessus ma tête ».81

II) The negotiations in Potsdam: two weeks of the summer 1945

The success or the failure of a negotiation can also come from the strategies organized by the protagonists. This approach describes the result of the negotiation as being directly bound to the offers and to the demands made by the parts to end in concessions. The Game theory, the comparative costs and the social psychology are mobilized for that purpose: for instance, the analysis of the cooperative and competitive behaviour. The aim of this part is to determine and analyse the different elements of negotiations, which played a role to achieve a final agreement. The strategic approach played an important role.

A) Getting ready to implement the strategy: the planning process

The focal point of T. SchelliIIng concept is the idea that two players can find a compromise, in anticipation of the expectations of the other, that is to say without explicitly communicating (by tacit negotiation)82: “focal point[s] for each person’s expectation of what the other expects him to expect to be expected to do”.83 Before going to Potsdam, it was evident that many points will be agreed very easily. Truman knew the will of USSR to talk about the Economic principles in Germany and the reparation. He prepared his

strategy to make different offers to Stalin during the conference. The explicit negotiation is the continuation of the tacit negotiation by other ways and conversely. One thing that Truman or Stalin didn’t take into account, was the cultural approach: in order to make the tacit negotiation work, the existence of a potential focal point is a necessity. For that purpose, one needs a shared culture allowing to see on each side the obvious solution, a structure of potential solutions letting appear clearly a relief solution and a relief which did not contain several striking solutions.  

1) Information gathering and using

Noticeable arrival: an overview of negotiations styles

Roosevelt went to Tehran and Yalta with enthusiasm. On the contrary, President Truman set off for Potsdam with sober. It was related in two of his letters to his mother, on July 3rd: “I am getting ready to go and see Stalin and Churchill, and it is a chore. I have to take my tuxedo, tails preacher coat, high hat, low hat, and hard hat, as well as sundry other things. Wish I didn't have to go, but I do and it can't be stopped now.” And on July 12th, from shipboard on his way to Potsdam, he wrote: “I wish this trip was over. I hate it. But it has to be done.” On July 15th, Truman and Churchill arrived in Berlin. Stalin, according to councillors, just suffered a small heart attack: it was delayed, but its arrival was announced for the next day. On July 17th, the morning of the first day, US president and Stalin had a private and friendly conversation. The two men were polite, cordial and Stalin agreed to lunch with Truman. The US president confessed he was surprised by the direct ways and conciseness of Stalin which was something completely different from the eloquence of Churchill. During the negotiation, it was important to notice this different style of negotiation, which was recurring.

One of the ten rules for virtual Negotiation was to find a style to negotiate: “not all styles work equally well in all settings.” The problem is the following: the negotiation style gives to the negotiator a reputation. Indeed, Churchill was very well known for his long speeches and his eloquence. During the Potsdam conference, the efficiency of the negotiations didn’t suppose long speeches but strong arguments. Churchill quickly annoyed Truman, Stalin and the other present councillors. Cadogan explained in his diary: “Churchill intervenait sans façon à chaque occasion, pour dire les bêtises les moins en rapport avec le sujet, et risquait ainsi à chaque fois de nous faire perdre le point en discussion.”

The Shaping Game

At the beginning of the conference, there was the moment to share the agenda. In a processual approach, it was the information gathering and information using: at this stage, it is the time of learning what you need to know about issues, about the other party, then the negotiators determine what they want to make for their preferred outcomes and settlement. This case is very singular because it is interesting to underline that they

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86 Ibid., p338.
87 Annex 4 : photo 1, p.31
88 LEWICKI Roy J., BARRY Bruce, SAUNDERS David M., Negotiation, Op Cit, p.190.
90 LEWICKI Roy J., BARRY Bruce, SAUNDERS David M., Negotiation, Op Cit., p.133.
92 LEWICKI Roy J., BARRY Bruce, SAUNDERS David M., Negotiation, Op Cit., p.117.
did not decide much in Potsdam. Tensions were based on such important matters that they chose most often to avoid or to work around these issues. Many elements showed these tensions during the negotiation. In Potsdam, the planning process was extremely essential. Lax and Sebenius describe this as “setting the table” or “the shaping game” for Watkins. At 17 p.m., on July 17th, 1945, the Big Three and their advisors penetrated in the Cecilienhof of Potsdam, and took sit around the large round table of negotiations. Presidency of this first session was offered at Truman, who started immediately the work by establishing a full agenda. He quickly enumerated the points that the United States wanted particularly to see addressed during the conference, and he asked his two colleagues to do the same. The US' list was the following: “1. l’instauration d’un Conseil des Ministres des affaires étrangères, 2. Etablissement d’une liste de principes et de conseils devant permettre l’administration interalliée de l’Allemagne par le Conseil de contrôle. 3. Mise à l’exécution de la “Déclaration sur l’Europe libérée”. 4. Entrée de l’Italie aux Nations unies. » In his desire to appear "businesslike" Truman neglected preliminary courtesies of use. Then, Stalin was able to list items which the Soviets wanted to see stand. These points were : « 1. Division et répartition entre les vainqueurs des marines militaire et marchande de l’Allemagne 2; Réparations dues par l’Allemagne et ses satellites 3. Pouvoirs de tutelle 4. Relations des Trois Grands avec les anciens satellites de l’axe 5. L’Espagne et Franco 6. Tanger 7 La Syrie et le Liban 8. La Pologne. » Churchill had not prepared a list of topics to bring to the agenda and the only issue he wished to emphasize was the Poland case. The lack of preparation of Churchill revealed his BATNA to the other. He showed that other topics didn’t had any importance. Stalin showed his concerns because (as the analyse will explain) the important points were the reparations and the question of Poland. He decided to put the Poland case at the end of his agenda.

2) Avoiding the Negotiator’s dilemma

Multiple-issue negotiations

Multiple-issue negotiations are more integrative because the parties can use processes to create “packages” that are mutually beneficial. In “multiple issue negotiations, the opportunity to create value may be lost in competitive dynamics that minimize trust and information sharing and that threat each issue in a distributive manner.”

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94 WATKINS M, Shaping the game: the new leaders guide to effective negotiating, Boston: Harvard Business School Press
95 Annex 4 photo 3p.32
97 Ibid. p.132.
100 Ibid., p. 121.
During the conference, the Big three were confronted to the Negotiator’s dilemma developed by Lax and Sebenius. In this dilemma, negotiation necessarily includes both cooperative and competitive elements, existing in tension. Negotiators face a dilemma in deciding whether to pursue a cooperative or a competitive strategy. This dilemma is closely related to the famous Prisoner's Dilemma: In the value-claiming view, hard bargaining is used "start high, concede slowly, exaggerate the value of concessions, minimize the benefits of the other's concessions, conceal information, argue forcefully on behalf of principles that imply favourable settlements, make commitments to accept only highly favourable agreements, and be willing to outwait the other fellow." For the authors, the most effective way to create value is to focus on the parties' differences. "The basic principle underlying the realization of joint gains from differences is to match what one side finds or expects to be relatively costless with what the other finds or expects to be most valuable, and vice versa." According to a cultural approach, the solution could be an effort of understanding which could take into account the motivations and the ideology of the others. Stalin, Churchill and Truman chose to meet at Potsdam conference: they decided to cooperate and had a cooperation view at the beginning. Despite their personality, the analyse of the case shows they wanted to save one more time their Alliance. Their will was to avoid this dilemma by creating value. But as they went along, the negotiators became tense and they refused to make concessions.

The BATNA’S

The Best Alternative To a Negociated Agreement (BATNA’s) is one of the key points of the reasoned negotiation theorized by Fisher and Ury in their best-seller called " Getting to yes ". By cultivating a strong outside alternative, you gain the power you need to walk away from an unappealing deal. The Stalin’s BATNA was more complex than others: for him, the question of reparation was essential. It was a promise of Yalta. It did not miss to remind it during the meeting. In Yalta, the allies suited that Poland had to obtain new lands in the North and in the West with a definitive decision that would be settled within a future peace conference. In Potsdam, the United States and Great Britain tried to deviate from the agreement concluded previously. The USSR BATNA’s was to say: USSR accepted a new agreement in Potsdam but they wanted to obtain the things promised in Yalta: the reparations and new borders in Poland. They considered that if they had not these points, they would then prefer to stop the negotiation because the Yalta’s agreement promised a best alternative.

B) Conflict management: outcomes and issues in Potsdam conference

A dual concerns model

The figure below (figure 1.3) represents the « dual concerns model » developed by J.Rubin, S.H Kim and D.Pruitt . Negotiators have two types of concerns: about others' outcomes and about their own outcomes.

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102 Ibid., p.50.
103 Ibid., p.59.
104 FISHER Roger, URY William, Getting to yes, Op Cit.
Five major strategies for conflict have been identified: Contending, Yielding, Inaction, problem solving and compromising. During the negotiation in Potsdam, several cases were faced. Actually, there was a first phase in which the Big three found agreement very easily. They chose subjects where their outcomes were common. Then, there was another phase: the latter was essential because it determined the future of the agreement. The turning point of the conference appeared at this moment (this aspect will be tackled in the point B). After the announcement of the agenda, the meeting continued with the examination of the first American proposals: the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers of the Big Five to prepare the Peace treaties. This Truman’s proposal was aimed to avoid: “la présence gênante d’un grand nombre de pays trop étroitement liés à la politique étrangère de Londres ou de Moscou”, it is a way to “limiter les possibilités d’actions unilatérales aussi bien des russes que des britanniques. Il devrait servir aux américains d’outil intermédiaire efficace dans leur objectif de liquidation des sphères d’influence.”

Aware or not, the other two leaders accepted it without much difficulty and even claimed themselves favourable to the project. It was a case of yielding for instance because they didn’t really had concern about their own outcomes but were favourable to the will of the US.

**Thomas-Kilmann Conflict styles applied to the delegations**

During a conflict or a negotiation, it is possible to identify “fives modes of behaviour that are commonly used to deal”: it is called Thomas-Kilmann Conflict styles as represented it below. For the case of the Council proposal, Churchill and Stalin were accommodating. The case of Germany was the second item on the agenda: these measures were divided into their major components: a political and an economic component. The actual political component on Germany didn’t raise difficulties: “après un bref

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108 Ibid.
examen au niveau des ministres des affaires étrangères, ils sera soumis aux Trois Grands qui l’adopteront sans plus de débats.”

The main reason explaining this facility was the indifference. Indeed, this was a project of a dismemberment of the country: each member of the Three Big felt more directly interested in it than in what concerned its own zone of occupation. Besides, it was decided that four commanders-in-chief would exercise the supreme authority. This decision was taken in collaboration between parties.

However, the study needs to underline the Churchill’s attitude during the negotiation: several times, his behaviour could have been associated with the Chicken Game theory. The notion of *Chicken game* is also used as a metaphor for a situation where two parties engage in a showdown where they have nothing to gain, and only pride stops them from backing down. Eden told at the end of the first plenary meeting that he was disappointed because of a conversation between Churchill and Stalin:

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Eden was very exasperated against Churchill. Entire German fleet was in the hands of the Great Britain and it was the best asset available to Great Britain within this hard bargaining.

C) The problem solving phase: the time of the turning point

Herbert C. Kelman elaborated the second illustration, called interactive problem solving. It aims to complete and to strengthen the processes of negotiation which take place at the official level. His principle is simple: it is a question of organizing, in regular intervals, seminaries gathering influential representatives of each party in the conflict. These meetings rest on the hypothesis that variations of attitude aroused by an interaction repeated in small groups (microprocess) can be the source of changes.

1) Differences leading to a deadlock: the role of the negotiators

Churchill left the Conference

On 21th of July, the situation became more complex about Poland case and reparations. The Big Three recognized the Provisional Government of Poland but there was a problem: the western border of the country. Russia occupied the entire eastern Germany and wanted this border. However, Churchill felt particularly concerned with all aspects of Poland, not only because of the commitment of land for this country, or Polish soldiers who bravely fought for Britain, but because freedom of Poland became a symbol case for all countries of western Europe. During this negotiation, Churchill had no success to convince the others because of his health: “la santé du premier Ministre s’est tellement détériorée qu’il n’a plus guère l’énergie de saisir les occasions qui se présentent.” said Lord Moran. On July 24th, the polish government arrived in Berlin under the leadership of Prime Minister Bierut and Foreign Minister Rzymowski. The morning plenary session on 25th of July was for Churchill the ultimate opportunity to express its concerns about Poland and Germany. It was clearly marked by ill-concealed bitterness. This was the end of the case without useful conclusion. The attitude of each party was more competitive.

The arrival of Atlee and Bevin in the negotiations

During the forced interruption of work from the 26th to the 28th of July, in the absence of the British delegation, Byrnes was dedicated to various preliminary consultations to break the impasse threatens to bog down the conference. The replacement of Churchill and Eden by the new Labour team (Atlee and Bevin) didn’t seem to have brought significant changes. Atlee was a realistic man and avoided the rhetoric: like Truman he wanted to see fast-forward the issues and preferred to leave its management to the specialists. Bevin led the British delegation and had a strong aversion for communism. That was why he yielded nothing to USSR.

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118 Annex 3: The last conversation between Churchill and Stalin which achieved to a deadlock
2) The Package deal: Ury’s strategies for managing difficult negotiations

The negotiations were blocked and Byrnes proposed his last solution on the 30th of July. It was a “package deal” setting, based on a single compromise encompassing all previous discussions, meaning the borders of Poland, the German reparations as the peace treaties of Romania, Bulgaria and Italy to the United Nations. In his Memoirs, Byrnes explained: “Je déclarai à Molotov, qu’un même accord réglerait les trois questions en suspens ou qu’il n’y aurait pas d’accord du tout: s’ils refusaient cela, le Président et moi repartitions immédiatement pour les Etats-Unis”. This “package deal” represented the Turning point of these negotiations. The concept is usually considered “in conjunction with stages and defined as "events or processes that mark passage from one stage to the next, signalling progress from earlier to later phases. Resolving an impasse, signing a framework agreement, developing formulas and then bargaining over details for instance.” W. Ury described a five-stage “breakthrough approach” which helped for managing difficult negotiations. “The essence of the Breakthrough strategy is indirect action. You try to go around his resistance. Rather than pounding in a new idea from the outside, you encourage him to reach from within. Rather than telling him what to do, you let him to figure out. Rather than trying to break down his resistance, you make it easier for him to break through it himself. In short, breakthrough negotiation is the art of letting the other person have it your way.”

The table below represents the different steps. The “package deal” followed exactly this way. During all negotiations, the US appeared as a mediator, and didn’t react. Then Byrnes decided to change the game after the other’s refusals to find a solution and a compromise. The package deal represented for the USSR a “golden bridge” and made it hard to say no to the agreement because of the US delegation's ultimatum.

![Table 18.1](image)

At this moment, the USSR needed to choose if the country would accept or not. They faced a choice which referred to their BATNA. According to the final agreement, Stalin obtained satisfaction (on the Polish border) and on all or almost all (reparations question): it was the “compromis de la clé de voûte”. (See the

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120 Ibid. p.164.
123 Annex 4.
124 Ibid., p.520
126 Ibid., p.9.
127 See figure 18.1 STRATEGY TABLE, Ibid.
The role of Byrnes was essential because the next day, USSR decided to accept the “package deal”. It was a good compromise for two parties: the question of reparations was a success for the American which could avoid to pay directly the reparations and it was a good thing to USSR also, because of the Polish Border. After this final agreement, it is very interesting to notice the absence of the Great Britain. Even if they were called the “Big Three” during all the conference, it is difficult to think they were effectively three. At the beginning, it was impossible to talk about an asymmetry of power, but step-by-step USSR and the US became the two big leaders of the negotiation.

**Conclusion**

_The conclusions of the agreements, a resolution case?_

« On croit à Dieu ou on n’y croit pas, on est pour ou contre la peine de mort, l’avortement ; ces opinions peuvent changer, mais elles ne sont pas négociables : il y a peu de chances que vous modifiez votre opinion sur ces sujets à condition que je modifie la mienne »

_Dupont_

_The signature of the agreements: real resolution or coming up of new tensions?_

After bidding, it was the moment to close the deal and implement the agreement. What is the assessment of these negotiations? On most of the questions, the Soviet delegation obtained satisfaction. In fact, the break between the Allies was closed. Even if the Ministers of Foreign Affairs would have prepared the peace treaties with Italy, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Finland – during the conference of Moscow in December 1945 – and then would have settled other issues (excepted on Germany) each party showed its willingness to strengthen its own positions. Moreover, the United States will be the first ones to stop the payment of the reparations. Then, they decided on the rearmament of Germany, to make their main fulcrum in Europe. This negotiation process was based on the Track One Diplomacy which « has the ability to use political power to influence the direction of negotiations and outcomes ». Roger Fisher, developed the “facilitated joint brainstorming” which is based on the following idea: diplomats can’t conclude a peace if the parties did not previously handle the diverse hatreds existing at every level. To be credible, a peace process must be led in the various parts of societies and either only in the high categories of officials. The Potsdam’s major problem was the avoidance of the culture and ideologies of each other’s. Every delegation conscientiously decided to ignore the will of power, the fears, the aftermaths of war, which were very strong elements to take into account. They wanted to reach a deal that wasn’t possible to implement in the future.

_Post Potsdam, beginnings of the Cold war_

The compromises showed there were not to be. They represented constructions carefully elaborated, which allowed afterward-opposed interpretations. Thus, it began soon clear that the compromise was not a way to reach an agreement, and that in reality it was a way to trick the opponent, pulling it deeper into a trap adroitly strained.

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129 Potsdam final agreement Annex 4 photo 5 and 6 p.33-34
131 LEWICKI Roy J., BARRY Bruce, SAUNDERS David M.,_Negotiation, Op Cit.,_ p.118.
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Annexes

- **Annex 1:**

This conversation is related to preliminary phase. Truman sent Hopkins to Moscow and Hopkins stayed in Moscow until June 7th, 1945 and met Stalin six times. The first conversation is the first meeting. (Vol 1, p.24 to 31).
On the other hand, on the morning of his death he had done a good deal of work and had written a number of important letters relating to domestic and foreign policies. None of his doctors had expected McIntire, had not even been at Warm Springs. The President never regained consciousness after his stroke and had died without any suffering whatsoever. Many of those who had been closest to him had felt that his quick, easy death was really preferable to his lingering on as a hopeless invalid. Mr. Hopkins said that the President had died fully confident of the victory which was in sight.

M. S. Stalin observed that Lenin had also died of a cerebral hemorrhage following a previous stroke which had left his hand paralyzed.

Mr. Hopkins said that on the trip home from Yalta the President had frequently reviewed with him the results of the Crimea Conference and that he had come away from that Conference with renewed confidence that the United States and the Soviet Union could work together in peace as they had in war. President Roosevelt on the trip home had frequently spoken of the respect and admiration he had for Marshal Stalin and he was looking forward to their next meeting which the President hoped would be in Berlin.

M. S. Stalin remarked that he recalled the toast at the Crimea Conference to their next meeting in Berlin.1

Mr. Hopkins said that he recalled his first meeting with the Marshal in July, 1941, during the troubled and anxious days of the German offensive. He said he remembered vividly the frankness with which Stalin had told him of the Soviet position and of the unalterable determination of the Soviet Union to wage war against Germany until final victory was assured. He had returned to the United States and conveyed to President Roosevelt his own conviction that the Soviet Union would hold fast and President Roosevelt had thereupon initiated the program of assistance to the Soviet Union. At that time most people believed that a German victory was inevitable but President Roosevelt, in spite of all such opinions had decided otherwise and through his leadership he had put through a program of aid to Russia.

M. S. Stalin observed that at that time there had been many doubts of the ability of the Soviet Union to keep going.

Mr. Hopkins said that although in 1941 the United States was not in the war, President Roosevelt had already decided that Hitler was just as much an enemy of the United States as he was of Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

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1 No record of the toast referred to has been found.
present trends continued unchecked the entire structure of world cooperation and relations with the Soviet Union which President Roosevelt had labored so hard to build would be to him a great anxiety at the present situation and also his desire Union and his intention to carry out in fact as well as in spirit all the arrangements, formal and informal which President Roosevelt had worked out together. Mr. Hopkins added that as the Marshal knew he had not been well and he would not be in Moscow unless he had felt the situation was serious. He also said he would not have come had he not believed that the present trend could be halted and a common basis found to go forward in the future.

Mr. Hopkins said that it was not simple or easy to put a finger on the precise reasons for this deterioration but he must emphasize that without the support of public opinion and particularly of the supporters of President Roosevelt it would be very difficult for President Truman to carry forward President Roosevelt’s policy. He said that, as the Marshal was aware, the cardinal basis of President Roosevelt’s policy which the American people had fully supported had been the concept that the interests of the United States were world-wide and not confined to North and South America and the Pacific Ocean and it was this concept that had led to the many conferences concerning the peace of the world which President Roosevelt had had with Marshal Stalin. President Roosevelt had believed that the Soviet Union had likewise world-wide interests and that the two countries could work out together any political or economic considerations at issue between them. After the Yalta Conference it looked as though we were well on the way to reaching a basic understanding on all questions of foreign affairs of interest to our respective countries, in regard to the treatment of Germany; Japan and the question of setting up a world security organization, to say nothing of the long term interests between the United States and the U. S. S. R. He said in a country like ours public opinion is affected by specific incidents and in this case the deterioration in public opinion in regard to our relations with the Soviet Union had been centered in our inability to carry into effect the Yalta Agreement on Poland.2 There were also a train of events, each unimportant in themselves, which had grown up around the Polish question, which contributed to the deterioration in public opinion. President Truman feels, and so does the American public, although they are not familiar with all the details, a sense of bewilderment at our inability to solve the Polish question.

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2 See vol. ii, document No. 1417, section vi.

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2 Cf. pol. pp. 31, 85.
THE HOPKINS MISSION TO MOSCOW

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M ARSHAL STALIN apparently had not heard of the appointment of
General Eisenhower and stated that Marshal Zhukov would be
appreciated by the Committee to represent the United States.
He implied that this would make it more difficult for
the Americans to do anything oneself.

M R. HOPKINS said the third question he wished to discuss was that
of the Pacific War and the future relations of the United States
and Soviet Union to China. He said that although he realized the answer
would depend on a good many considerations it would be most useful
to the American military authorities if he could take back some idea
of the approximate date of the entry of the Soviet Union into the war
in the Pacific.

M ARSHAL STALIN said he would discuss that question with his
advisers and let Mr. Hopkins know.

M R. HOPKINS concluded that there was of course the Polish question
which he hoped to discuss here. He added that if Marshal Stalin for
his part had any political questions concerning the United States
which were worrying him he would of course be glad to discuss them.

M ARSHAL STALIN replied that they had in fact several disturbing
questions on their minds in regard to the United States. He added
that he was very glad that the President had sent Mr. Hopkins to
Moscow and thus give[al] him this opportunity to explore all these
questions.

M R. HOPKINS stated that he would certainly not have gotten out
of bed to come to Moscow had he not believed that the future well-
being of hundreds of millions of people depended on the relationship
of the United States and the Soviet Union, nor would he have come
had he not believed that any difficulties could be reconciled.

M ARSHAL STALIN said he hoped that Mr. Hopkins’s views would
prove to be right.

M R. HOPKINS said he would stay here as long as it was necessary
to accomplish what could be accomplished, although naturally he did
not wish to be away too long.

M ARSHAL STALIN said he was entirely at Mr. Hopkins’s service and
now that war in Europe was over he had more time at his disposal
than he had, for example, a year ago.

M R. HOPKINS said he hoped the Russians would find the body of
Hitler.

M ARSHAL STALIN replied that in his opinion Hitler was not dead
but hiding somewhere. He said the Soviet doctors thought they
had identified the body of Goebbels and Hitler’s chauffeur, but that

4 Erich Kempta.
Annex 2: Processual approach: Figure 4.2 and 4.3, LEWICKI Roy J., BARRY Bruce, SAUNDERS David M., op cit, p.117

Last conversation between Churchill and Stalin (July 25) concerning the Poland question

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**CHURCHILL:** «Les Polonais incitent les populations allemandes à quitter la zone Russe. Il nous est impossible d’accepter cela sans tenir compte des conséquences de cette émigration sur les questions de ravalement et celle des réparations. La situation vers laquelle nous nous dirigeons signifierait que les Polonais garderaient les céréales et le charbon, tandis que nous, Occidentaux, héritiers de cette masse supplémentaire de populations déplacées à nourrir».

**STALINE:** «Nous devons comprendre la position des Polonais : ils ont l’occasion de se venger de siècles et de siècles d’injustice (...)»

**CHURCHILL:** «Si la conférence se termine dans dix jours sans que nous soyons parvenus à nous entendre sur la question et si, par conséquent, les Polonais sont autorisés à jouer le rôle de cinquième puissance occupée à ravailler la zone de Pologne, que les dispositions soient prises pour assurer une répartition équitable des vivres produits en Allemagne entre toute la population de ce pays, la conférence s’achèvera sur un échec. Je suppose qu’il ne nous restera alors qu’à nous rabattre sur la proposition du Secrétaire d’État, et à ne plus considérer chacun que notre propre zone. (...) Il faut bien reconnaître que nous n’avons pas avancé d’un pas sur ce point.»

**STALINE:** «Le charbon et la métallurgie de la Ruhr sont plus importants que le ravalement en vivres.»

**CHURCHILL:** «Ce charbon, il faudra le troquer contre d’autres vivres venant de l’Est. Il nous est impossible d’accepter que la Russie puisse disposer de tout ce que produit sa zone d’occupation, et prétendre encore réclamer des biens venant de notre zone.»

**STALINE:** «Les fournitures et approvisionnements devront provenir de toute l’Allemagne.»

**CHURCHILL:** «Et pourquoi pas les vivres, alors ?»

**STALINE:** «C’est à voir (...) L’Allemagne a toujours eu à importer des vivres.»

**CHURCHILL:** «Et comment payer les réparations ?»

**STALINE:** «Il reste pas mal de graisse en Allemagne.»

**CHURCHILL:** «Jamais je ne pourrai consentir à un état de choses qui condamnerait les habitants de la Ruhr à mourir de faim simplement parce que les Polonais occupent toutes les terres céréalières de l’Est. (...)»

**STALINE:** «Le charbon que vendent les Polonais est leur propre charbon, et pas celui qui provient des territoires anciennement allemands. Je n’ai pas l’habitude de pleurer le sort des autres. Nous avons perdu cinq millions d’hommes morts. Nous manquons terriblement de notre charbon, comme de tant d’autres choses. Si je décrivais mon Premier Ministre.»

**CHURCHILL:** «Nous enverrons le charbon de la Ruhr n’importe où, pourvu qu’en échange nous recevions des vivres.»

**STALINE:** «Cette question doit être discutée, ou reconsidérée dans son ensemble.»

**CHURCHILL:** «Nous ne faisons ici qu’échanger nos points de vue. J’ai fini.»

**STALINE:** «Quel dommage.»

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Annex 4: photographs of the Potsdam conference:
By U.S Army Photographs

Photo 1:

CECILIENHOF PALACE: The conference Room in which the principal tripartite meetings of the Berlin Conference were held is behind the bay windows in the center of the photograph

Photo 2:

THE THREE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, JULY 17, 1945: In foreground, left to the right: Major Birse, Generalissimo Stalin, Mr. Pavlov, Fleet Admiral Leahly (behind Pavlov), President Truman, Prime Minister, Mr. Bohlen (almost completely hidden by Chruichill). In background, left to the right: Sir AArchibald Clark Kerr (between Leahly and Truman), Foreign Commissar Molotov, Mr. Atlee.
FIRST PLENARY MEETING, JULY 17, 1945: Seated at the table, clockwise from Mr. Atlee (facing camera, directly behind flags): Mr. Atlee, Mr. Vyshinsky, Foreign Commissar Molotov, Generalissimo Stalin, Mr. Pavlov, Mr. Gromyko, Fleet Admiral Leahy, Secretary Byrnes, President Truman, Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Davies, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Foreign Secretary Eden, Prime Minister Churchill, Major Birse. Advisers, foreground, backs to camera, left to right: Mr. Harriman, Mr. Clayton, Mr. Dunn, Mr. Matthews, Mr. Pauley, Mr. Cohen. Advisers, background, left to right: Sir William Strang, Major Theakstone, Sir Zrchibald Clark Kerr, unidentified Soviet official, Mr. Gusev, Mr. Gribanov, Mr. Podtserob, Mr. Novikov;

TENTH MEETING OF THE FOREIGN MINISTERS, JULY 30, 1945

Seated at the table, clockwise from Mr. Gromyko (directly behind flags): Mr. Gromyko, Mr. Clayton, Mr. Dunn, Secretary Byrnes, Mr. Page, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Foreign Secretary Bevin, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, Major Theakstone (almost hidden by Clark Kerr), Mr. Gusev (partly hidden by Theakstone), Mr. Vyshinsky (partly hidden, with glasses), Foreign Commissar Molotov, Mr. Pavlov. Advisers, foreground, left to right: Mr. Ward, unidentified British official, Mr. Dixon. Advisers and staff, background, left to right: Mr. Kozyrev, Mr. Tsrarapkin, Mr. Podtserob (in front of Tsrarapkin), Mr. Novikov, Mr. Arutyunyan (largely hidden by Molotov), Mr. Saburov, Mr. Gribanov (standing), Mr. Solov, unidentified guard (standing), Mr. Maisky, unidentified Soviet official, two unidentified officers (standing), Mr. Cannon (blurred), Mr. Thompson (behind Cannon), Mr. Matthews (largely hidden by Page), Mr. Yost.
AUGUST 1, 1945 : Seated, left to the right : Prime Minister Atlee, President Truman, Generalissimo Stalin. Standing, left to the right : Fleet Admiral Leahly, Foreign Secretary Bevin, Secretary Byrnes, Foreign Commissar Molotov.

Photo 6: Facing page of the Agreement
Photo 7 and 8: Germany-Poland: proposed territorial changes

Zoom of the map: